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This thesis effort is a study of the domestic tele-
communications industry with specific emphasis upon the
principal publicly regulated telephone and telegraph
utilities, American Telephone & Telegraph and Western
Union respectively. The principal elements of the study
will concern market structure, market conduct and market
performance of the telecommunications utilities. In par-
ticular, a significant amount of attention will be directed
towards such subjects as vertical integration, antitrust
policy, technology and innovation, and the FCC's current
studies towards limited competition within the industry.
Concluding work will focus on DOD ' s role as a consumer of
telecommunication services and facilities and its potential
influence with regard to changing or maintaining the status
quo of the domestic telecommunications industry. An histor-
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States telecommunications industry is ana-
lyzed in this thesis in terms of its structure, conduct
and performance. In fact, the industry is composed of one
giant corporation, several other large companies, and numer-
ous small companies which have a significant impact on the
economy and the welfare of the United States. The tele-
communications industry was selected by the authors because
of its immense interest to them. As students in the Tele-
communications Management Curriculum, this interest has
been stimulated by courses in teleprocessing, real-time
information systems and microeconomics. Furthermore, the
Department of Defense (DOD) already leases a considerable
amount of services and facilities from the industry and due
to the economic climate prevalent in the DOD at present,
the authors hypothesized that further leasing of services
and facilities from the telecommunications common carriers
rather than full-scale independent DOD development of




Structure, conduct and performance are key elements in
the economic analysis of an industry. After an historical
survey of the development of the telecommunications industry,
which is covered in Chapter Two, the authors will analyze
the sub-elements which comprise the structure, conduct and
performance of the United States telecommunications industry
and discuss how these sub-elements interact. Chapter Three
will discuss the structure sub-elements which, for the pur-
poses of this study, consist of: concentration ratios of
the firms in the industry, product differentiation, and
barriers to entry. The conduct of the individual firm(s)
within this structure is described in Chapter Four. Conduct
sub-elements consist of: product quality, market competition,
price determination and the influences on behavior of firms
in the industry. Chapter Five discusses the performance of
the industry. Sub-elements of performance addressed are:
product performance/technological progress, technical
efficiency, allocative efficiency, and full employment /in-
come distribution. Chapter Six discusses DOD as a consumer
of telecommunications services. Alternative methods for
satisfying DOD demand are also discussed. Lastly, an over-





The initial research for this effort quickly demon-
strated the importance of the three elements of industry
analysis identified by Richard Caves in American Industry :
Structure, Conduct, and Performance . Further aid in estab-
lishing the ground rules for an industry study were offered
by Industrial Organization , second edition, by Joe S. Bain;
The Structure of American Industry by Walter Adams ; and The
Economics of Industry by Roger Sherman.
The analysis of the United States telecommunications
industry is compounded by the fact that it is heavily regu-
lated by both the federal and state governments. Excellent
texts which provided worthwhile background information but
more importantly focused upon the important regulatory issues
of the telecommunications industry were The Telecommunications
Industry , by Manley R. Irwin; The Economics of Regulation:
Principles and Institutions . Volumes I and II, by Alfred E.
Kahn ; The Structure and Performance of the U S. Communications
Industry , by Kurt Borchardt; and The Economics of Regulation
,
by Charles F. Phillips, Jr.
In addition to many more books, student theses, periodi-
cals, and government reports, it would be appropriate to
mention those publications which contain current information
on the status and trends of the telecommunications industry
11

and which proved invaluable in precipitating leads and ques-
tions in addition to providing hard information. These in-
clude Telecommunications , DataComm User , Datamation , Admin -
istrative Management , Business Week , Barrons and The Wall
Street Journal .
Concerning past studies of the United States telecommuni-
cations industry, the authors found that most studies were
conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
,
most often in relation to justifying or rejecting new tariffs
proposed by the common carriers. FCC "Docket Numbers" thus
proved to be our most valuable asset in reviewing previous
work in this area, other than for the texts, mentioned
previously, by Irwin and Borchardt.
One of the first efforts of the chapter on structure
was the categorization of companies in the telecommunications
industry by standard industrial classification (SIC) codes.
Where indicated in the chapters on structure, conduct and
performance, assumptions are stated which served to facili-
tate the analysis of the industry. Sources of information
regarding SIC's was obtained from: The Standard Industrial
Classification Manual; Standard and Poor's Register of Cor-
porations, Directors and Executives; Directory of Companies
Filing Annual Reports with the Securities and Exchange
Commission; U.S. Independent Telephone Association,
1 o

Independent Telephone Statistics, Volume 1, 1976; Dun and
Bradstreet Million and Middle Market Directories, 1976;
Investors Management Sciences, Inc. COMPUSTAT tape; Moody's
Investor's Service; Fortune's The Fifty Largest Utilities,
July 1976; and Federal Communications Commission, Statistics
of Communications Common Carriers, 1974.
In addition to the above references, many other articles,
hearings, books and reports were utilized in the preparation
of this thesis . Oral conversations were also elicited from
people at various agencies and organizations with regard to
the development of the study. Among those agencies and
organizations contacted were:
1. Bureau of the Census
2. Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
3. Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP)
4. U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Communications
5. U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Communications
6. Director, Telecommunications Command and Control
Systems (DTACCS) in Office of Secretary of
Defense (OSD)
7. Defense Communications Agency (DCA)
8. U.S. Navy Office of Legislative Affairs
13

9. Ad Hoc Committee for Competition in Tele-
communications (ACCT)
10. American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T)
11. General Telephone & Electronics Corporation (GT&E)
12. Western Union Telegraph Company
13. U.S. Independent Telephone Association (USITA)
C. EXPLANATORY NOTES /TERMS
Several terms and phrases will be used rather frequently
in the course of this study and the authors feel it is impor-
tant to inform the reader of the interpretations and limita-
tions placed on these terms and phrases by the authors.
1. Intercommunications
The first and most important distinction to be made
concerns the scope of this communications study: the defini-
tion of telecommunications . The authors ' intent is to ex-
amine the "intercommunications" aspect of the telecommunica-
tions industry as opposed to the "mass communications" area.
Intercommunications deals with point-to-point communications
or the ability of individuals or entities to communicate
directly with one another either in a uni-directional or bi-
directional manner. Characteristics of intercommunications
include the ability of the originator to furnish and control
the content of messages transmitted and the ability to make
14

possible individual selections of connections through switch-
ing devices. Mass communications on the other hand pertains
to broadcasting and the dissemination of information from a
central node to peripheral stations. Unlike intercommunica-
tions, mass communications is solely uni-directional and
does not employ switching devices from the emanating node
to the listener. Within the classification of intercommuni-
cations, we should distinguish between ''public" services
(i.e., AT&T's public switched telephone system or the public
message service of Western Union) and "private line services,"
peculiarly suited to private business or governmental organi-
2
zations . To dintinguish the two, in private line services
(PLS) the subscriber has a direct line between stations in
different cities; calls using the private line, therefore,
do not require switching at either the local exchange or
toll trunk level and as such may be referred to as non-
switched service in contrast to ordinary local or long dis-
tance calls which require switching through exchanges. PLS
is inherently a better communications media than the public
switched networks for voice, record and especially data
transmission because of less line noise and greater available
bandwidth due to the absence of "signaling" frequencies.
However its cost is greater.
15

2. Natural Monopoly and the Regulated Sector
The concepts of "natural monopoly" and government
regulation are indeed complex and no more than a cursory
overview can be attempted in explanation. Advocates exist
on both sides of the question of competition versus monopoly
ranging from those who cite technological imperatives as the
need for granting private monopolies all the way to the other
end of the spectrum to those like Walter Adams who categorize
"natural monopolies" as an "intellectual device that enables
one to be simultaneously against monopoly in general and for
monopoly in particular." Throughout the literature in the
field of telecommunications the reader is confronted with
"natural monopoly" frequently and in many different contexts
(historical, economic, requirements for system integrity,
etc.) so as to suit the argument (s) of the advocate. What-
ever the correct answer to that question is, the fact is
that the domestic telecommunications industry exists today
as a regulated public utility, a representative part of all
public utilities which the competitive market model does not
describe or purport to describe. Indeed,
...the primary guarantor of acceptable performance
is conceived to be (whatever it is in truth) not
competition or self restraint but direct govern-
mental prescription of major aspects of their
structure and performance.^

Principally because of large economies of scale,
and the fact that public utilities comprise a general class
of business which is designated by our laws and courts as
"business affected with a public interest," we have wit-
nessed the evolution of what is called the "regulated sec-
tor." It can be distinguished from the other sectors of
the economy by four elements: the government controls
market entry; the government fixes the prices of the indus-
try; the government prescribes conditions of quality and
service; and the government imposes an obligation upon the
utility to serve all customers on an equitable basis.
As mentioned above, the governmental regulation of
business has as one of its principal sources the constitu-
tional grants of, and subsequent legal interpretations
placed upon, governmental authority. In fact, the Consti-
tution gives to Congress the power to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce and it is this clause which forms the
basis for much governmental authority today. In Gibbons
v. Ogden , the Supreme Court said interstate commerce means
transportation and communication across state boundaries
and internal state commerce which has an effect in other
states or which concerns more than one state. This case,
which first interpreted the Commerce Clause, is cited as
the present-day authority of the government to regulate such

interstate activities as the telephone and telegraph
utilities.
The regulated sector of our economy is therefore
an accepted fact, whether the mandate be constitutional,
legal, or economic. In this context the structure and
conduct of the telecommunications industry will be analyzed
3 . Common Carriers
"Common carrier" will be a term used frequently
throughout the study. A quick researching of the phrase
would show that in the course of development of the common
law of the English-speaking peoples, the concept of public
utility first emerged in connection with transportation and
the instruments necessary for transportation. The term
common carrier was applied to all those engaged in serving
the public with transportation and the associated services.
As common carriers, they held themselves out to
serve the public on demand and were allowed to charge
no more than a reasonable price. By analogy, the
concept of the regulated common carrier was extended
to modern public utilities as technology advanced,
since they, too, are transporters, although of gas,
electricity, water, telephone messages, and urban
passengers . °
Today the term common carrier is applied to those
telephone and telegraph companies operating over the public
switched network. These companies are called the "estab-
lished common carriers" and consist of the giant AT&T and
18

its operating companies, Western Union and the over sixteen
hundred independent telephone companies which are organized
as the U.S. Independent Telephone Association (USITA) . In
addition to the established common carriers, several other
categories of common carriers exist: specialized common
carriers (SCC's) dealing primarily in private line micro-
wave services and limited public offerings; value added
networks /carriers (VAN's) which impose an "added value"
such as data processing and packet switching on lines leased
from established common carriers for resale to private users;
domestic satellite carriers (DSC's) which operate PLS ; and
public land mobile radio common carriers (RCC's) which offer
such services as mobile radio /telephone service, paging
services, and rural radio services. Discussion of RCC's
will be minimal in this thesis because of their small size
in relation to the total domestic telecommunications indus-
try and the fact that the FCC ' s recent administrative rulings
dealing with competition within the telecommunications in-
dustry principally concern the established common carriers,
the SCC's, the VAN's, and the DSC's, all of which will be
discussed at length in the following chapters on structure,
conduct, and performance. SCC's, VAN's and DSC's are fre-
quently referred to as other common carriers (OCC's) in the
19

literature available and will be referred to herein in a
similar manner whenever convenient.
20

II. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
The following survey of the development of the United
States telecommunications industry is divided loosely into
six separate chronological periods. They are generally
periods of time when related sets of events occurred but
should not necessarily be given appellations such as the
"initial development stage," the "consolidation stage," the
"communications satellite age," and so on. In the course
of the historical survey, primary focus will be on the
development of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company,
the Western Union Telegraph Company, and lastly the inde-
pendent telephone companies (ITC's) as a general group
rather than by specific companies. This approach was taken
because admittedly the dominant firms in the field histori-
cally have been AT&T and Western Union. Note how the tele-
graph and then telephone industries grew, sometimes in con-
cert, most often separately.
A. 1832 - 1894
In 1832 Samuel F. B. Morse, a professional artist and
instructor in art at New York University, began experimen-
tation on an electrical communication system. Three years
21

later in 1835 he demonstrated that such a system was feas-
ible after showing that signals could be transmitted by
wire at what were then, incredible speeds. Morse was unable
to convince private interests to enter into the new field
of telegraphy however and telegraphy marked time until 1843
when Congress passed the Telegraph Act and appropriated
$30,000 to connect Washington and Baltimore by a commercial
telegraph wire. The first message was sent by Morse in
1844 with the prophetic words, "What hath God wrought?" The
line was operated by the Post Office until 1847 when Congress
refused to renew the appropriation due to the line's
unprofitability.
Thereafter the telegraph was developed by private owner-
ship. Morse and his associates raised money to extend the
line to Philadelphia and New York and the telegraph soon
found wide use in the transmission of news and the dis-
patching of trains. Indeed a major stimulus to the growth
of the industry was the rise of the Associated Press and its
9
use of the telegraph to distribute news releases. Small
companies, numbering about fifty by 1851, soon began oper-
ating in other parts of the country. A process of consolida-
tion began the same year and many of these small telegraph
companies were merged into a large new company which by 1856
had become known as the Western Union Telegraph Company.
22

Five years later the first transcontinental telegraph line
had been built, primarily along the railroad rights-of-way,
attributable, as mentioned previously, to the fact that
railroads were one of telegraph's initial subscribers.
Two significant events occurred in 1866. The first
concerned the formal entry of government into the domestic
telegraph business. Passage of the Post Roads Act author-
ized the Postmaster General to fix rates annually for govern-
ment telegrams, in addition to giving the telegraph companies
construction rights over the public domain, post roads, and
navigable streams and waters. Secondly, Western Union
acquired two significant competitors - the American Tele-
graph Company and the United States Telegraph Company.
Western Union then dominated the infant industry until 1881
when the Postal Telegraph Company entered the telegraph
business. Purchased as a subsidiary by the Commercial Cable
Company in 1886, Postal bought out independents where it
could and by the end of the century was in a position to
compete favorably with Western Union.
A further advancement of the regulatory arm into the
emerging telegraph industry occurred in 1887 when the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC) received Congressional
authority to require interconnection among telegraph companies.
23

The telephone industry was undergoing a separate path
of development from the telegraph industry during the latter
quarter of the nineteenth century after the invention of
the telephone by Alexander Graham Bell. The successful
transmission in 1876 by wire of a complete sentence of
spoken words heralded the introduction of a piece of equip-
ment which would change forever the traditional modes of
communication. "Yet, even after the first successful exper-
iment in 1876, many doubted that the telephone had future
significance.' As an example, the Bell patents, filed in
1876 and 1877, were first offered to the Western Union
Telegraph Company for $100,000.
For some reason, the telegraph company rejected
the offer, but then later acquired the rival patents
of Elisha Grey, Thomas A. Edison, and Amos Dolbear.
A patent fight proved inevitable. A Supreme Court
decision (four to three) awarded the basic patent
right of the telephone instrument to the Bell
interests in 1876. In subsequent negotiations,
Western Union acknowledged the validity of the Bell
patent, withdrew from the telephone field, licensed
Bell its own Grey patents, agreed not to enter the
telephone industry, and promised to pay 20 per cent
of the cost of Bell's new patents developed or
acquired by the Bell interests. In turn, Bell agreed
to stay out of the telegraph field and to reimburse
Western Union of all royalties on Bell's patents
.
Given the advantage of hindsight, a more fateful decision
is unimaginable. Bell and his associates constructed the
first telephone line in 1877 from Boston to the suburb of
Somerville, Massachusetts. The following year, the association

of Bell business interests was incorporated in Massachusetts
as the Bell Telephone Company. In 1879, it was incorporated
as the National Bell Telephone Company and in 1880 reorgan-
ized into the American Bell Telephone Company. Throughout
this nascent period, American Bell licensed companies and
individuals to operate and leased equipments to them, taking
in return a stock interest. This position was further
strengthened by additional purchases of stock and consolida-
tions and mergers. In 1881, American Bell acquired a sub-
stantial interest in the Western Electric Manufacturing
Company of Chicago and changed its name to the Western
Electric Company. Thus by this date, "a program that en-
visaged the co-ordination of all phases of the telephone
industry was formulated: the supply of local exchange ser-
vice, the development of long-distance service, and the
organization of manufacturing affiliates to supply the
necessary equipment were all developed under the control
of the parent company.' In 1885 the American Telephone &
Telegraph Company (AT&T) was incorporated as a wholly owned
subsidiary of American Bell. (The Supreme Court ruling of
1876 had not denied the Bell interests entry into the private-
line telegraph service.) AT&T's primary function was to
serve as the "long lines" division of American Bell, by
connecting the local exchanges of the parent company. Thus

by acquiring controlling interests in local exchanges, by-
establishing the necessary long lines interconnections, and
by acquiring Western Electric with its concomitant ability
to furnish the equipment needs for the telephone system,
the American Bell Telephone Company was preparing itself
for 1893 and 1894 when the original Bell patents would
expire.
ITC's began to materialize almost immediately after the
issuance of the first Bell patents in 1876 and 1877. Ameri-
can Bell instituted over 600 patent infringement suits in
the following years, up until 1893 when the patents began
to expire. Many of these companies went out of business
upon being sued, but the Supreme Court rendered a decision
in 1888 involving all the sued independent companies which
were still solvent, upholding the original Bell patents in
their entirety. Therefore the growth of ITC's dates princi-
pally from 1894 when the patents expired.
Two things to note about the period 1832-1894 are (1)
the separate development of the telegraph industry and the
telephone industry as represented by the decision reached
by Western Union and National Bell in 1879 to "leave" each
other alone (later influences would almost certainly change
this arrangement but for this period the two growing in-
dustries were essentially unto themselves), and (2) the
26

growing regulation of the industries by the government:
witness the Post Roads Act; the authority of the ICC over
telegraphy interconnection; the Supreme Court rulings con-
cerning the Bell patents; and the specter of the Sherman
Act. The latter element potentially represented the biggest
regulatory effort made by the government. Passed by Congress
in 1890, the act sought to deal with the existence of trusts
or monopolistic combines and the political and economic power
they exercised.
B 1895 - 1922
The expiration of the original Bell patents had been
skillfully anticipated. Theodore N. Vail, the President of
American Bell, stood by to reap the rewards of his prepara-
tion for the flurry of new telephone companies organized by
independents. As mentioned earlier, the country's long dis-
tance lines, operated by AT&T, were under control of the
American Bell Company; telephone equipment manufacturing
capacity was principally under American Bell through its
Western Electric subsidiary; and licensing agreements had
placed many operating companies under control of American
Bell.
Most of the efforts by independent companies to pene-
trate the market were in the West, in areas not directly

competitive with American Bell. Those efforts which were
made to penetrate Bell-dominated areas failed generally due
to unprofitable rate provisions included in charter provisions
and the lack of capital necessary for expansion and improve-
14
ment.
Overall, however, the period 1900-1907 represented the
time of greatest growth among independent phone companies,
especially in the rural areas.
By 1902, out of 1,051 incorporated cities in the
United States with a population of more than 4,000,
1,002 were provided with telephone facilities.
Independent telephone companies had exclusive ser-
vice in 137 of these cities, the Bell interests
served 414 cities, and the remaining 451 cities
were served by both independents and Bell interests.
By 1907, the Bell System owned 3.1 million stations,
while independent companies owned 3 million. -*
Controlling almost half of the market share represented
the high water mark for the independents, but the hold was
precarious at best. American Bell controlled newer patents,
threatened and/or instigated patent infringement suits, re-
fused to sell independents telephone equipment, exerted
pressure on the financial community to dry up the supply of
capital to the independents and also refused to interconnect
its long distance facilities. Indeed, as several experts
in the field such as Manley R. Irwin and Charles F. Phillips,
Jr., have noted, the competitive aspects of this period are
indeed striking as opposed to the market structure and con-
duct of later years.
28

It should be noted that rarely, if ever, have
charges brought against the Bell System for such
alleged misdeeds been upheld in court. Also
there is absolutely nothing wrong with controlling
patents or with launching patent -infringement suits.
Nor is it illegal to refuse to buy from or sell to
certain companies which are competitors. The critic
seems to forget that 'natural monopoly' was not an
accepted concept at that time, and that competition
was quite fierce at times among telephone companies.
Over all, the competitive practices of the Bell
System seem appropriate, given the times and the
accepted business practices of the times.
In addition to these competitive practices, Vail had
developed by this time a philosophy espousing AT&T as the
single national monopolistic telephonic and telegraphic
communications system. (Early in 1900, American Bell trans-
ferred all the investments of its subsidiaries to the Ameri-
can Telephone & Telegraph Company and the following year
the two companies consolidated, with AT&T becoming the parent
holding company.) Consequently in 1909, AT&T decided to
enter the telegraph industry by acquiring control of Western
Union. Vail gave some of the following reasons for the pur-
chase which was accomplished the same year:
...if Western Union were controlled by the tele-
phone company, all of its lines could be utilized to
a greater or lesser extent for toll lines and long
distance telephone business. The telephone company
will be obligated to spend a great many millions of
dollars, fully as many as the telegraph company will
cost, to provide toll line facilities which could be
largely avoided if it had the use of Western Union
facilities, or the control rather - as the mere use,
without the absolute control, would be of no account. °
29

Due to AT&T's continuing competitive practices, its
policy of acquisition of independents, its refusal to inter-
connect its "long lines" with independents and the Panic of
1907, the ITC's market share started to wane. In combination
with the control of Western Union, AT&T was on its way toward
the single national system it wanted.
"The combined telephone-telegraph operations were short-
1 Q
lived. y Complaints from ITC's and from the Postal Tele-
graph Company prompted an investigation by the ICC which
had been granted broad powers by the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910
to regulate interstate and foreign telephone and telegraph
services
.
Debated and negotiated for several years, and in response
to a threatened antitrust suit by the Wilson Adminstration,
AT&T capitulated. In a letter from N. C. Kingsbury, vice-
president of AT&T, to the Attorney General of the United
States in December 1913, AT&T agreed to sell its Western
Union stock, agreed to interconnect with those ITC's which
met its equipment standards and finally promised not to
20
acquire control of competing telephone companies.
Thus after a period of several decades in which the
telephone and telegraph industries had virtually been devel-
oping as separate entities, an attempt had been made by
AT&T to merge the two public systems. After four tumultous
30

years the effort had been repudiated and "as a result of
the government's insistence upon competition, or at least
multiple companies, and AT&T's compliance therewith, the
system was divided for approximately two decades into tele-
phone (voice) and telegraph (record) communications.'
The passage of the Willis -Graham Act in 1921 rescinded
the "Kingsbury Commitment." Therefore that part which dealt
with not acquiring competing telephone companies was invali-
dated and AT&T's expansion plans resumed again, however
acquisition was subject to approval by state public regula-
tory agencies. This was followed in 1922 by the Hall Memo-
randum (named for E. K. Hall, a vice president of AT&T)
which explained AT&T's acquisition policy as one opposed to
purchases or mergers with connecting or duplicating companies
"except in special cases." It read in part:
We should consider that such an exception was proved
only in cases where it seemed to be demanded either:
(1) For the convenience of the public as evidenced
by the wishes of State authorities or by local public
sentiment or in adjoining the territory served; or
(2) By special reason which made the transaction
seem desirable and essential from the point of view
of the protection of our own property or the general
public service.
The Hall memorandum continues to reflect AT&T's acquisition
policy.

One final note on this period of development in the
telephone and telegraph industries requires attention and
that is government regulation. In addition to the newly
granted regulatory powers of the ICC and the Willis -Graham
Act, this period saw the Sherman Act interpreted by the
Supreme Court and the passage of the Clayton Act by Congress
in 1914, two events which would have a significant impact
in subsequent antitrust dealings. Section 2 of the Sherman
Act permits different interpretations - "is it a crime to
have a monopoly, to seek a monopoly, or to seek and get a
monopoly.' In 1911, the Supreme Court ruled that Standard
Oil and American Tobacco were guilty under sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act and ordered their dissolution into sep-
arate firms. In effect, the Supreme Court indicated that
under the Sherman Act the two giant companies had "unreason-
ably" restrained trade - it was not just because they had
restrained trade but because they had done so unreasonably.
Thus the Sherman Act in outlawing "every . . . combination . .
.
in restraint of trade" was not interpreted to be a sweeping
ban.
In a further ruling, in the U.S. Steel case in 1920,
the Supreme Court found U.S. Steel innocent of any wrong-
doing in restraint of trade. In the Supreme Court's words
..."the law does not make mere size an offense or the
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existence of unexerted power an offense." "Only monopolizing,
and not monopoly, constituted an offense." ^
Finally the Clayton Act of 1914 was passed to lend
further substance and definition to the Sherman Act and the
subject of restraint of trade. The Clayton Act focus is
more on the conduct of individual firms whereas the Sherman
Act concerns conspiracies or agreements among firms.
C. 1923 - 1945
AT&T's horizontal merger policy, begun again in 1921-
1922 after the termination of the "Kingsbury Commitment" by
the Willis -Graham Act, continued through the 1930' s in
accordance with the Hall Memorandum. AT&T purchased only
distressed companies or those ITC's in areas where duplica-
tion of facilities existed, in both cases with the per-
mission of state regulatory officials.
State officials were particularly lenient in
permitting mergers of companies serving the same
cities. By this time, the idea that duplication
of operating companies was uneconomic had become
widely accepted; the public was inconvenienced by
the necessity to have two telephones in homes and
offices in order to be sure of having complete
communication service. Philadelphia was the last
major market to permit duplication; in 1943, its
two companies were merged. 26
In 1924 a significant organizational change occurred at
AT&T. Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. was established to
take over the product development engineering department
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and a portion of the patent department at Western Electric.
AT&T's research and development department was transferred
to Bell Labs in 1934. Well-known for its scientific dis-
coveries and innovations, including the transistor, it is
half owned by AT&T and Western Union respectively.
A committee was established by the Secretary of Commerce
in 1933 to study communications regulation. The result of
the study was a recommendation for a single agency to regu-
late all communications services, and thus the sequence of
events was begun which ended in the passage of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 and the creation of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC). As amended in 1937, the purpose of
the Act was to regulate interstate and foreign communication
by wire and radio.
So as to make available, so far as possible, to
all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio communica-
tion service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges, for the purpose of the national defense, for
the purpose of promoting safety of life and property
through the use of wire and radio communication, and
for the purpose of securing a more effective execution
of this policy by centralizing authority with respect
to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio
27communication ....*'
Specific responsibilities were given to the FCC regarding
the regulation of rates, practices, classifications, account-





One of the first major actions of the FCC, prompted by-
Congress, was a comprehensive investigation of the telephone
industry. Undertaken in 1935, the FCC spent four years on
the study, reporting out in 1939 with its major findings:
The concentration of the Nation's telephone
business, and in particular of its interstate tele-
phone business, in the hands of the Bell Telephone
System is such that whereas the problem of regula-
tion is one of large magnitude, it is relatively
simplified by reason of this very integration, as
contrasted with the railroad, gas, electric-power,
maritime, and motor-carrier fields of Federal regu-
latory effort. The fundamental problem underlying
the provision of effective regulation in the inter-
state telephone field appears to consist largely of
developing ways and means, as well as positive and
effective machinery, for the continuous acquisition
of the basic factual data, and of providing methods
for the prompt and adequate digestion and analysis
of such facts in such form and manner as to render
oo
Commission action thereon readily possible. °
Essentially a quasi-judicial ratification of AT&T's
development to date, the study was a significant compilation
of data concerning the industry and made it possible for
the FCC to institute its policy of "continuous surveillance":
regulatory decision-making relying heavily upon informal
hearings, discussions and procedures backed-up by a solid
data base, rather than public hearings convened periodically
to collect data and render formal decisions.
Meanwhile, one of the two major telegraph companies had
fallen upon hard times. Following the stock market crash of
1929, the Postal Telegraph Company had experienced increasingly
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larger annual deficits. At this time Postal Telegraph
handled about 15 per cent of the domestic telegraph traffic.
In 1940 the FCC recommended the consolidation of existing
telegraph carriers into one unified system. Three years
later, Congress passed the Domestic Merger Act, authorizing
Western Union's acquisition of the Postal Telegraph Company
and additionally authorizing the merged company to acquire
the telegraph facilities of any carrier not principally a
telegraph carrier. Thus the door was opened for Western
Union to try and acquire AT&T's Teletypewriter Exchange
(TWX) private line services.
The negotiations opened that same year and con-
tinued for a period of two years. Late in 1945,
however, Western Union's financial ability to
acquire the facilities was impaired by reason of
retroactive wage increases ordered by the War Labor
Board. That order practically wiped out the com-
pany's financial reserves and materially increased
its future operating costs. 29
Negotiations were not resumed until 1964.
A major change to the previous rulings of the Supreme
Court in antitrust matters occurred in 1945 when the court
ruled in U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America that Alcoa had
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing the
manufacture of newly refined aluminum. "For the first time,
the Court took the view that a high level of seller concen-
tration itself could constitute a violation of Section 2. ,JU
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The Supreme Court had decided that a 90 per cent concentra-
tion level was "high" enough - a standard had been set;
whether or not it was the correct standard, the fact remained
that "a standard centering on market structure replaced one
31
which depended essentially on market conduct."
D. 1946 - 1956
"After World War II, the market for communications ser-
32
vices changed greatly." The demand for telephonic services
increased markedly while the demand for public message
service declined severely. Additionally business demanded
new types of communication services to satisfy the expanding
network of their operations: such services as private tele-
typewriter exchange, alternate voice/record, and voice/data
services. As previously mentioned Western Union had merged
with the Postal Telegraph Company and was also attempting to
acquire AT&T's TWX services when negotiations had to be ter-
minated. The point to remember is that because of the decline
in public message service, Western Union was attempting to
broaden its base as the sole "public" record communications
common carrier. In fact it was depending heavily upon AT&T
in the provision of record communications because Western
Union increasingly replaced its obsolete inter-city lines
with leased lines from AT&T. Western Union also had to
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utilize AT&T terminal equipment when using AT&T leased lines
in the provision of alternate voice/record or voice/data
services. We thus have the situation of the dominant voice
common carrier helping to maintain the viability of the
record communication common carrier. Not until the 1960's
when Western Union's microwave installations were installed
across the country did the reliance upon AT&T's inter-city
leased lines decline.
The conversion from coaxial cable to microwave which
occurred around 1946 was a landmark event in the telecommuni-
cations industry. Microwaves are very short waves which
utilize the upper regions of the radio spectrum above 890
megahertz and are well-suited for bulk point-to-point
communications traffic. Additionally the absence of pole
line rights-of-way; minimal expansion cost; and flexibility
in circuit use among data, voice and video made it a very
attractive alternative to open wire transmission. As we
shall see, the alternative opportunities presented by micro-
wave technology coupled with eventual FCC regulatory decisions
subsequently led to the creation of private and public micro-
wave systems independent of the traditional landline com-
panies. This subject will be covered in greater detail in
the discussion of the next historical period.
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In January of 1949, the Department of Justice filed an
antitrust suit against AT&T and Western Electric, the essence
of the charge being that the two companies had monopolized
"the production, manufacture, distribution, sale, and in-
stallation of telephones, telephone apparatus, telephone
equipment, telephone materials, and telephone supplies,'
in violation of the Sherman Act. The government was attack-
ing the vertically integrated relationship between AT&T and
Western Electric, stating that AT&T had accomplished the
alleged monopolization
(1) by vesting in Western the exclusive right
to manufacture and sell such equipment to such
operating companies and to the Long Lines Department
of AT&T;
(2) by requiring such operating companies and
the Long Lines Department of AT&T to purchase their
required equipment exclusively from Western ....34
The government charged that the principal evils created
by this monopolization were excessive charges to the oper-
ating companies of AT&T and delays in the introduction of
cost-reducing innovations, because of the absence of compe-
tition. In its suit, the remedy sought by the Department of
Justice was the compulsory licensing of all applicants under
Bell System patents at reasonable royalties; the break-up
of Western Electric into three separate companies; and a
dissolution of the tie between Western Electric and AT&T,
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with the requirement thereafter that the AT&T operating
companies be required to employ competitive bidding in all
purchases of equipment, materials, and supplies. -*
The case never went to trial and was surrounded by con-
siderable political pressure on all sides. In 1956 a consent
decree was signed which essentially left the relationship
between AT&T and Western Electric intact. "The remedies
in this part of the case were directed toward making regu-
lation rather than competition more effective."
Lastly we will set the stage for one of the major events
of the late fifties and early sixties. In 1954 the Central
Freight Company, a Texas trucking company, and the Minute-
Made Corporation, a citrus processing firm, applied for
licenses to build, own and operate their own microwave sys-
tems. This was a direct challenge to the then current policy
of the FCC to deny applications from private concerns for
communication services where common carrier facilities from
the traditional landline companies were available to them.
The FCC ' s policy was primarily influenced and shaped by the
common carriers who opposed the application for private
systems on the grounds that the radio spectrum was not in-
finite and that congestion of the air waves would ensue as
well as higher cost and poorer service. In the face of
this the private applicants demonstrated that, in fact,
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construction of their own communication facilities would
37
mean lower costs than the common carrier's existing tariffs.
E. 1957 - 1971
This period of time offers the beginning acts in the
drama currently unfolding in the telecommunications industry-
concerning "selected competition," or the introduction of
competition to areas once considered secure under the um-
brella of "natural monopoly." The pressure from private
concerns for liberalization of the aforementioned policy
restricting the construction of private communications sys-
tems, specifically microwave, was lifted by the FCC in the
"Above 890" decisions of 1959 and I960. 38 Citing the many
applications, ... "and concluding that there were adequate
frequencies above 890 megacycles to take care of present and
reasonably foreseeable future needs of both the common
carriers and private users, it deprecated the threat to the
common carriers and emphasized the advantages of competition
in spurring the development of communications technology.
(Units of frequency measurement have changed from the time
of the initial "Above 890" decisions from cycles to hertz.)
The "Above 890" decisions thus centered on the crux of
the question of whether the public would be better served
by elements of competitive entry or by the established

common carriers on the other hand. The "Above 890" decisions
involved private users only. A more competitive threat to
the common carriers "bread and butter" came in 1964 when
Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) applied for FCC
approval to operate public point-to-point microwave communi-
cations service between Chicago and St. Louis. For five
years afterwards, charges and contentions ensued between the
common carriers and the "upstarts" like MCI and although
what MCI proposed was a direct duplication of Bell and
Western Union facilities, "it offered two things that the
Bell companies and Western did not: first, low rates - its
proposed charges were less than half those of the established
carriers - and second, far greater freedom and flexibility
in use of the service: customers could attach such equip-
ment as they saw fit and up to five of them could share the
use of a single channel, thus further reducing the cost of
each.
It was these final two points which in the end persuaded
the FCC to grant MCI its license. After the ruling, the FCC
was deluged with similar requests, among them that of the
Data Transmission Company (DATRAN) . These new public common-
carriers, principally in the microwave communications ser-
vice, came to be known as the specialized common carriers
(SCC's). The responses of the established carriers during
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this period (1960-1968) of "selected competition" approved
by the FCC, included all the legal and economic arguments
for the traditional monopolistic communications service;
charges that the SCC's were "cream skimming" the lucrative
routes; and the introduction of such new services as TELPAK,
Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS) , Dataphone Digital Service
and the Series 11,000 Tariff. These will be discussed further
in Chapter Four.
With the potential for generating far greater turmoil in
the telecommunications industry than microwave technology be-
fore it, communications satellites came to the fore in July
1962 with the launching of Telstar I and the opening of a
new era in communications. Suffice it to say that many
firms wanted in on the ground floor and the initial ques-
tions in the area of communications satellites tended to
focus on the corporate vehicle with which to bring communi-
cations relay by satellite into commercial operations. The
overseas carriers (RCA Globcom, Western Union International,
International Telephone & Telegraph, etc.) sought joint
satellite ownership as an extension of existing carrier sub-
marine cables. They would lease circuits to the carriers
individually who in turn would make them available to the
public for voice or record traffic. On the other hand
there were aerospace companies such as General Electric and
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Lockheed which "called for the creation of a carrier's
carrier and argued that the entity's ownership should in-
clude equipment suppliers and the public at large, as well
as the overseas carriers." With both the constricted
ownership proposal of the overseas carrier and the broadened
ownership proposal of the aerospace firms in contention, the
FCC and Department of Justice debated the merits of the
issues at length but eventually the FCC view prevailed that
a joint non-profit organization would be formed whose owner-
ship would be assigned to the existing overseas carriers.
The entity would sell satellite circuits to the
overseas carriers and would agree to purchase hard-
ware and related suppliers on a competitive bid basis ...
The carriers obviously regarded competitive procurement
as a trade-off to satellite ownership.^
Thus in 1962 Congress passed the Communications Satellite
Act establishing the Communications Satellite Corporation
(COMSAT) whose ownership would be divided equally between
the overseas common carriers and the investing public. The
issue of domestic satellite (DOMSAT) ownership and the es-
tablishment of a DOMSAT system were not resolved at this
time.
As mentioned previously, message telegraph volume began
to decline after World War II. In fact, from 1945 to 1966,
the volume of message telegraph service fell 70 per cent
and the number of telegraph offices declined 41 per cent,

while eleven rate increases resulted in a cumulative increase
of 160 per cent in the price of public message service be-
tween 1945 and 1964. Yet the actual volume, 70.2 million
message telegraphs in 1966, indicated a continuing large
demand for the service. Because of this decline in tele-
graph volume the FCC instituted a study of the telegraph
industry in 1962, which sought to answer the question of
whether the decline was in response to the price system
and changing consumer desires or due to forces distorting
the rate relationships between message telegraph and sub-
45
stitute services. The report of the Telephone and Tele-
graph Committees (which conducted the inquiry for the FCC)
found that:
(1) Western Union rationalized price increases
because of wage increases and needed revenues to
support diversification in Telex (its public switched
teletypewriter network) and private telegraph lines
but as the increased prices of public message service
came into line with higher quality alternative
communications, old users of Western Union began to
divert so that subsequent rate increases were never
sufficient
(2) the Bell System imposed interconnection
restrictions on Western Union which limited Western
Union's ability to compete in private line fields,
and
(3) the Bell System, through its pricing practices
had adversely affected Western Union's growth.
The FCC's Telephone and Telegraph Committees, in their
final report in April 1966, called the Domestic Telegraph
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Investigation, called for several steps to make Western
Union a viable entity. (Note: in 1963, Western Union was
divided into two companies, Western Union Telegraph Company
and Western Union International, both subsidiaries of
Western Union Corporation. Discussion of Western Union
hereafter will refer to the Western Union Telegraph Company,
which is the domestic telecommunications operation of Western
Union Corporation.) These steps included transferring Bell's
TWX service to Western Union; elimination of interconnection
restrictions that prevented Western Union from competing
effectively with the Bell System in the provision of private
line services; and precluding AT&T's re-entrance into the
exchange telegraph market by making an exchange teletype-
writer offering available over its public switched network.
The sale of TWX to Western Union was finally consummated in
April 1971. As already mentioned negotiations had origin-
ally begun in 1943! Final sale had been contingent upon
assurances from the FCC to AT&T that the FCC "would not
construe the sale as acquiescence by AT&T in a program call-
ing for complete separation of voice and record services. "^'
In October of 1965, the FCC began its second formal in-
vestigation of the telephone industry. Several problems
formed the basis for the investigation, among them the
"Seven-Way Cost Study," Western Electric 's prices and profits,
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and rate base items. The "Seven-Way Cost Study," submitted
to the FCC by AT&T in 1964 in connection with the Domestic
Telegraph Investigation, revealed that in the Bell System's
seven interstate services, the profits from the competitive
services - TWX, private line, and TELPAK - averaged 2.9,
1.4, and 0.3 per cent respectively while in Bell's non-
competitive services - WATS, for example - profits averaged
10 per cent. (These percentages are expressed in terms
of the ratio of net operating earnings to net investment.)
"The study was obviously laden with controversy; but the
evidence was highly persuasive that Bell had employed its
monopoly markets to underwrite losses in its competitive
markets."^ The FCC subsequently divided the investigation
into several phases, however one of its most important con-
clusions stated that the Bell System's rate of return on
interstate and foreign communication services should be in
the 7 to 7.5 per cent range.
The policies against foreign attachments and interconnec
tion to the Bell System which AT&T practiced over the years
was challenged in the Carterfone proceedings of the 1960's.
Remember that AT&T had consented in the Kingsbury Commitment
of 1913 to interconnect where the attachments measured up to
AT&T quality specifications. However a general attitude
still continued at AT&T to prohibit interconnection in all
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but "unusual merit" cases. Even though the Hush-A-Phone
Case demonstrated both a demand by consumers and the fact
that the device would not impair the telephone network,
AT&T continued to interpret the court's ruling against a
flat prohibition of foreign attachments narrowly. (The
Hush-A-Phone was a purely mechanical cuplike device which
could be snapped on to the telephone and, by confining the
speaker's voice to its enclosure, provided privacy for the
conversation of the speaker. )^ The next challenge to AT&T
on the issue of foreign attachments came from Carter Elec-
tronics Corporation which sued AT&T and the General Tele-
phone & Electronics Company (GTE - the major telephone
company independent) in 1966 over the use of its Carterfone.
The Carterfone was a cradle-like instrument which utilized
an acoustic /inductive mechanism to interconnect private
radio communications with the Bell System or independents by
placing the conventional telephone headset in the cradle. ^^
The Federal District Court/ in Texas referred the regulatory
issue to the FCC and in 1968 the FCC ruled that the tariff
provisions of AT&T and GT&E prohibiting foreign attachments
were unreasonable, unlawful and discriminatory, and ordered
the provisions stricken from the tariffs. Thus the door
opened all the way for terminal manufacturers who could now
interconnect their computer equipment with the public switched
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telephone network provided the quality parameters had been
satisfied. (Note: it should be pointed out that, histori-
cally, certain classes of users, such as the railroads and
the military, even prior to "Carterfone," have been per-
mitted to interconnect with the telephone system with no
53documentation of network harm.)
One major antitrust event occurred during this period
when the Department of Justice filed an antitrust suit
against ST&E in 1964 to block GT&E's acquisition of several
independent phone companies on the west coast. The Depart-
ment of Justice contended that the acquisition would fore-
close the communications equipment market to independent
manufacturers. However in light of the consent decree
signed by AT&T in 1956, the suit was eventually withdrawn
on the grounds that it was incompatible with the AT&T
ruling.
The final event of significance during this period was
the establishment of and report of the President's Task
Force on Communications Policy. President Johnson announced
the appointment of the Task Force in 1967 and directed it
to make a comprehensive study of both the domestic and
international communications posture of the United States.
Its report was issued in 1968 and with respect to domestic
communications policy dealt substantively with the areas of
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DOMSATS, the domestic telecommunications carrier industry
and the establishment within the Executive Branch of the
federal government of a telecommunications capability. This
capability is currently represented by the Office of Tele-
communications Policy (OTP)
.
F. 1972 - PRESENT
The past several years have generally seen the attention
of the telecommunications industry focus around the follow-
ing general areas : the advent and development of competitive
DOMSAT programs, the ever growing trend toward the merging
of data communications and data processing, and just recently
a concerted, well-financed effort by the established common
carriers to legislatively repeal the competitive gains in
the industry won by the SCC ' s in recent years.
Since 1972 when the FCC announced its "Open Skies" policy
toward the development of DOMSATS and thus opened the flood-
gate for a deluge of applications, the established common
carriers and overseas carriers as well as new interested
concerns have been striving hard to develop their own sys-
tems and get them launched and operational. Eight applica-
tions were originally filed with COMSAT -General, a subsidiary
of COMSAT, for the development of DOMSATS and five of these




General together with AT&T; Western Union; the American
Satellite Corporation; GT&E; and RCA Global Communications,
Inc. CML, a combine of COMSAT -General, MCI and Lockheed,
was tentatively approved by the FCC for DOMSAT development
but the concern had no definitive plans. GT&E eventually
merged its efforts with the COMSAT -General and AT&T team.
CML later went through a restructuring with International
Business Machines Corporation (IBM) purchasing 55 per cent
of the stock with COMSAT -General retaining the remainder.
The FCC has ruled that IBM and COMSAT -General can each only
own a maximum of 45 per cent of the stock so a third partner
has been sought and in January 1976, joined by Aetna Life
and Casualty Insurance Company, the trio won FCC approval
for the launching of a $250 million DOMSAT system in what
has been described as a major challenge to AT&T's dominance
of domestic communications. The new company will be known
as Satellite Business Systems (SBS)
.
The Consumer Communications Reform Act (CCRA) of 1976,
satirically referred to as the Monopoly Protection Act of
1976, has been introduced in both houses of Congress and
will come up for a vote probably in 1977. In a well-lobbied
57 58
effort, ' AT&T has sought passage of the act which will
have a detrimental effect on the limited competition encour-
aged in the telecommunications industry by the FCC ever
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since the 1960's. The CCRA would principally do two things:
first, not permit the operation of a SCC's communication
network where it geographically duplicates the network of
an established common carrier and secondly make the indi-
vidual state regulatory commissions rule separately on the
quality and appropriateness of a manufacturer's or SCC's
terminal equipment. The administrative expense of the latter
proposal is very prohibitive especially as it would effect
small SCC's. Thus the CCRA is viewed with apprehension by
the SCC's who could very well go out of business due to its
passage.
A major antitrust suit was launched by the Department of
Justice in November 1974 calling for the breakup of AT&T,
charging that the Bell System has monopolized the markets
for telecommunications services and related equipment.
Essentially the suit says that AT&T's first priorities have
tended to favor policies that protect its markets and ensure
its monopoly at the expense of supplying the most efficient
and economical service to the public. The suit has just
cleared jurisdictional litigation and the Supreme Court has
ruled that a Federal District Court in Washington, D. C.
has jurisdiction on the suit, rather than relegating it to
the FCC. This was a direct repudiation of AT&T's arguments.
The antitrust suit will now go to trial March 1, 1977.
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G. CURRENT INDUSTRY MAKE-UP
The past pages have presented an abbreviated survey of
some of the notable events in the development and growth of
the domestic telecommunications industry. The telegraph
industry is headed by Western Union which through diversifi-
cation into private line service and satellite relay is
attempting to remain a "viable entity." The Bell System,
AT&T, serves over 123 million telephones as of 1976. It
has a net plant investment of $70 billion; total operating
expenses exceed $18 billion and net operating revenue exceeds
$10 billion (all figures from 1975) . Bell accounts for over
90 per cent of long distance telephone calls and 82 per cent
of local exchange service in the United States. Western
Electric accounts for 70 per cent of the domestic production
of communications equipment. The nation's 1,618 independent
telephone companies serve over 26 million telephones in all
62 f\"\ 64.
states except Rhode Island and Delaware. ' The largest
of the independents, GT&E, is often referred to as "Baby Bell"
although its financial figures are relatively small compared
to AT&T. GT&E does serve the entire state of Hawaii however
and the ITC's service such major cities as Rochester, New
York; Tampa, Florida; Lincoln, Nebraska; and Santa Monica,
California.
The structure, conduct and performance of the common
carriers will be discussed in succeeding chapters.
53

III. STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
The United States domestic telecommunications industry,
as indicated previously, consists of several sectors, each
of which provides a variety of telecommunications services.
They are:




2. Telegraph sector (Western Union only)
3. Other common carriers (OCC's)
--specialized common carriers (SCC's)
--value added networks (VAN's)
--domestic satellite carriers (DSC's)
4. Public Land Mobile Radio Common Carriers (RCC's)
--telephone companies
--other firms
5. Non-telephone interconnect companies (IC's), i.e.
PBX and KTS equipment.
Table 3-1 is a compilation of significant data for each of
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revenue, and total communications plant assets from 1960 to
1975 in 5 -year intervals.
Table 3-1 shows that the overwhelming core of the in-
dustry consists of the telephone common carriers which are
privately owned and governmental ly regulated. In 1975 the
telephone sector accounted for almost 97 per cent of the
operating revenue and slightly over 97 per cent of the total
6 5
communications plant of the entire industry; the remaining
3 per cent consist of the other five sectors combined. For
this reason, this chapter will emphasize the structural
elements of the telephone sector, and examine briefly the
other sectors at the end of the chapter.
An industry's conduct and performance are ultimately
determined by its structure; this chapter will examine the
important elements of structure in the domestic telecommuni-
cations industry. In his textbook on industrial organization
Joe S. Bain defines market structure as "...Those character-
istics of the organization of a market that seem to exercise
a strategic influence on the nature of competition and pric-
ing within the market." Many elements of market structure
could be studied. John M. Vernon in Market Structure and
Industrial Performance: A Review of Statistical Findings
proposes a list of over sixteen elements of market structure;
however he accurately points out that "the length of this
57

list and the ease with which it could be extended raise a
methodological problem concerning the hypothesis that market
structure determines conduct and performance." Our
attention will be confined to only four main elements of
structure:
1. The degree of concentration
--the number and size distribution of sellers and
buyers in the market
--vertical concentration and its implications
2. The character and importance of product differentiation
3. Conditions of entry to the market
4. Regulation.
(Historically, the telecommunications industry has been sub-
ject to both federal and state regulation. Regulation can
be considered under barriers to entry; however regulation
has had such a tremendous impact on the structure of this
industry, it will be discussed as a separate element. In-
deed, it is this important factor which separates the tele-
communications industry from other domestic industries such
as large steel companies, drug manufacturers and automobile
producers.) Bain addresses the use of these important ele-
ments (degree of seller concentration, degree of buyer con-




At times, market structure has been defined more
broadly- -e. g. , as 'The economically significant fea-
tures of a market which affects the behavior of firms
in the industry supplying the market.' So construed,
market structure could embrace every objective cir-
cumstance - psychological, technological, geographical
or institutional - that might conceivably influence
market behavior. According to this definition every
market has a multitude of characteristics, and every
market is in some degree structurally unique. We
do not espouse this concept of market structure here
because a very loose and frequently ambiguous use of
the idea of structure is involved, and also because
meaningful intermarket comparisons and meaningful
generalizations about the influence of structure on
behavior are effectively forestalled if the content
of 'structure' is made so comprehensive that no two
markets can be viewed as structurally alike. °
B. CONCENTRATION OF THE INDUSTRY
Concentration is an operational measure which refers to
the number and size distribution of firms; it offers a way
to locate an industry somewhere in the realm of two extremes,
monopoly and competition. The number of firms or establish-
ments in an industry tells us little; it is size in relation
to the market which is of prime importance, i.e. we want to
know the share of an industry accounted for by the largest
firms in the industry.
All goods and services sold in the United States are
classified under a United States Census Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) System. (See U.S. Bureau of the Budget,
Standard Industrial Classification Manual; Washington, D.C.,
U.S. GPO 1967). The following Standard Industrial
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The 366 Group No. is the manufacturing or equipment market
for telecommunications; the 481 Group No. is the communica-
tions services which are provided and is considered the
traditional as well as predominant classification for
communications
.
Many different private marketing and management service
companies (Moody's, Standard and Poors, Dun and Brads tree t,
COMPUSTAT, Fortune, Forbes) and government agencies (Depart-
ment of Commerce, Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal
Communications Commission) compile industry information by
SIC codes. A review of these and other publications high-




1. As mentioned previously, the telecommunications
industry is dominated by and highly concentrated
in the telephone sector (this aspect will be covered
next)
.
2. Until recently, there were few companies which
manufactured telecommunications equipment.
1. The Telephone Sector
The telephone sector consists of two segments:
(1) The American Telephone and Telegraph Co. (AT&T) -<
commonly referred to as the Bell System
(2) 1,618 independent telephone companies (ITC's).
The number of companies suggest that this sector would fall
closer to the competition extreme rather than monopoly; how-
ever, number of companies alone indicates little and can be
very misleading. A statistical summary of the telephone
sector in the United States from 1966 to 1977 is presented
in the following tables:
Table 3-2 shows the number of telephones and employ-
ees in the independents and the Bell System, plus their total
over a 10-year period (1966-1975). It also shows the total
operating revenue and total investment in plant, with similar
breakdowns
.
From this table, it is apparent the Bell System
dominates the telephone sector, providing 82 per cent of the

TABLE 3-2
Bell Total Bell &
Independents System Independents
TELEPHONES (000 Omitted)
1975 26,823 121,800 148,623
1974 25,826 118,146 143,972
1973 24,351 113,960 138,311
1972 - 22,796 108,811 131,607
1971 21,444 103,698 125 , 142
1970 20,312 99,902 120,214
1969 19,254 95,942 115,196
1968 18,125 91,122 109,247
1967 16,953 86,776 103,729
1966 15,975 82,813 98,788
The per cent breakdown for Number of Phones in 1975
* 82% The Bell System
* 18% The Independents




1975 158,000 788,000 946,000
1974 163,000 812,000 975,000
1973 161,000 818,200 979,200
1972 155,000 797,200 952,200
1971 151,367 796,500 947,867
1970 147,704 793,200 940,904
1969 138,417 755,000 893,417
1968 129,430 696,700 826,130
1967 121,410 673,300 794,710
1966 115,028 667,000 782,028
The per cent breakdown for Number of Employees in 1975
* 83.3% The Bell System
* 16.7% The Independents
Source: USITA Telephone Statistics, Vol. 1, 1976.

Bell Total Bell &
Independents System Independents
TOTAL OPERATING REVENUES ($000 omitted)
1975 $5,500,000 29,590,723 $35,090,723
1974 4,920,000 26,761,000 31,681,000
1973 4,316,990 24,072,000 28,388,990
1972 3,788,699 21,388,000 25,176,699
1971 3,322,679 18,951,983 22,274,662
1970 2,891,814 17,368,544 20,260,358
1969 2,564,881 16,057,756 18,622,637
1968 2,261,790 14,428,866 16,690,656
1967 1,987,043 13,310,606 15,297,649
1966 $1,843,976 12,419,140 $14,263,116
The per cent breakdown by Total Operating Revenues in 1975:
* 84% The Bell System
* 16% The Independents
Bell Total Bell &
Independents System Independents
TOTAL INVESTMENT IN PLANT (000 omitted)
1975 $21,200,000 89,194,378 $110,394,378
1974 19,600,000 82,700,000 102,300,000
1973 17,418,533 75,520,000 92,938,533
1972 15,555,142 68,492,000 84,047,142
1971 13,958,567 62,049,465 .76,008,032
1970 12,390,327 56,171,376 68,561,703
1969 11,001,144 50,525,650 61,526,794
1968 9,774,435 46,137,147 55,911,582
1967 8,699,648 42,556,611 51,256,259
1966 $ 7,737,335 39,366,859 $ 47,104,194
The per cent breakdown by Total Investment in Plant in 1975
* 81% The Bell System
* 19% The Independents
Source: USITA Telephone Statistics, Vol. 1, 1976.

domestic telephone services as measured by the number of
phones, and its operating revenue accounting for about 84
per cent of the telecommunications industry. The ITC ' s pro-
vide the remainder 18 per cent of the domestic telephone
service (as measured by number of phones) and account for
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about 16 per cent of domestic operating revenue. The
statistics for the independent telephone companies are some-
what misleading. There are 1,618 independent telephone
companies in the United States. Most of them are small,
non-affilliated companies which include cooperatives and
municipal systems; however, among them there are three (3)
companies which control over two-thirds of the independent
telephone market. They are General Telephone and Electronics
(GTE alone controls almost half of the independent telephones)
,
United Telecommunications Inc. and Continental Telephone Cor-
poration. Table 3-3 is a breakdown by number of phones,
operating revenues, and total investment in plant, of these
three "holding companies" compared against the total ITC ' s
.
AT&T (the Bell System) plus these three independent com-
panies control approximately 95 per cent of the nation's
telecommunications market (as measured by number of phones)
;
the telecommunications industry is highly concentrated in
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The most striking feature of the telephone sector is
the "vertical integration" among the four major telephone
companies previously discussed (AT&T and the three large
ITC's). It is this salient feature of structure which
gives AT&T and the three independents their predominance
in both the equipment and service markets. "Vertical con-
centration" as John M. Blair states: "refers to operation
of a firm in more than one state of the production process,
typically involving more than one industry in which materials
and services flow successively from an earlier to a later
stage of production or vice versa through units under the
firm's control." Each of the four telephone companies
are vertically integrated through ownership of a tele-
communications manufacturing affiliate. They are:
Telephone Common Carrier
Organization




4) Continental Telephone Corp.
Manufacturing Affiliate
1) Western Electric









Conduct and performance are greatly affected by the struc-
tural implications of "vertical concentration." To gain a
fuller understanding and appreciation of this fact the Bell
System structure is examined in detail. (Note: The basic
relationship between the Bell System and the independents
may be characterized as complementary with most independents
serving as local telephone monopolists (where Bell operating
companies do not presently reach) interconnecting with AT&T
Long Lines and the Bell operating companies. Therefore an
examination of GTE, United Telecommunications or Continental
Telephone would yield almost identical findings.)
In terms of assets, the Bell System is the largest non-
financial corporation in the world. Total assets in 1975
were over 80 billion dollars. Referring back to Table 3-1,
the Bell System operating revenues in 1975 were $29.6 billion
and its total communications plant investment was $89.2
billion. The largest industrial corporation in the United
States as ranked by Fortune, May, 1976 is Exxon Corp; in
terms of net assets the Bell System is almost 2\ times larger
than Exxon Corp. The Bell System has a monopoly of local
and toll telephone service in the U.S.; they account for
over 85 per cent of its operating revenue. (Most economists,
as Bain states, generally agree that control of over 757o of
an industry by one firm constitutes a monopoly.) The Bell
67

System also encompasses virtually all other aspects of the
telecommunications industry. It provides the majority of
the facilities used in transmission of television and radio
programs and is the primary supplier of private line data
and voice service. In the Radio Common Carrier Service and
interconnect market, the Bell System accounts for over 90
per cent of the total revenues. To get a perspective of
the total enormity of the Bell System, if the Bell System
were in fact a country in terms of gross national product,
72it would be the 25th largest in the world. Figure 3-1
depicts the size of the Bell System in relation to the
independent telephone companies and the other five sectors.
How is the Bell System structurally defined and what does
it encompass?
The Bell System is defined as the American Telephone and
Telegraph Co. , its principal domestic Bell Telephone Operating
Companies (BOC's), the Western Electric Company (WECO) and
Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL) . Figure 3-2 depicts the
Bell System structure and interrelationships. AT&T exem-
plifies the holding company in the U.S. telecommunications
industry. The main interrelationships are summarized by
Manley R. Irwin to be:
AT&T holds all or nearly all of the stock of twenty-
one of the largest operating companies in the United
States. In addition AT&T holds a substantial stock
position in two other operating telephone companies.
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Note: Although only 1975 operating revenues are shown, the
Bell System has "controlled" at least 847, of the total
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The Long Lines Department which participates in
rendering toll service in the U.S. is a part of AT&T.
AT&T is the sole share holder of a manufacturing and
supply affiliate, Western Electric; AT&T and Western
Electric in turn own Bell Telephone Laboratories . The
obvious point of this relationship is that AT&T is a
holding company. It owns the supplier of communica-
tions equipment - Western Electric, Long Lines and
the Bell Operating Companies. The prices and costs
that occur among these corporate entities are
essentially intra corporate transactions.'^
Irwin expands further on the interrelationships
among these entities:
AT&T's relationship to its Bell Operating Companies
is consummated through a License Contract in which
Bell agrees to provide, inter alia , a management
service in terms of financing, marketing, engineering
advice, as well as acces to the developments of Bell
Telephone Laboratories.
The relationship between the manufacturer and the
Operating Company is formalized by a Standard Supply
Contract. In that Contract, the Operating Companies
are not required to purchase from Western Electric.
On the other hand, Western Electric assumes the
obligation of supplying the Operating Telephone
Companies with equipment, apparatus, and supplies
at reasonable prices.
Together these entities and relationships, known as
the Bell System, enable Bell Laboratories to conduct
R&D and for WECO to manufacture products. The pro-
ducts are sold to the Bell Operating Companies which
utilize them in the rendering of service to the sub-
scribing public. Vertical integration of buyer and
seller of the telecommunications equipment is con-
gealed through holding company (AT&T) control.
^
In order to realize the magnitude of this vertical
concentration, Western Electric, the Bell System's manufac-
turing subsidiary will be briefly examined.

- Western Electric Company (WECO) , itself has a number
of subsidiaries. They are:
* Teletype Corporation (100%)
* NASSAU Recycle (100%)
* Manufacturer's Junction Railway Corp. (99.9%)
* Sandia Corporation (100%)
* Western Electric Company Limited (London) (100%)
* Bell Telephone Laboratories (50%)
- Western Electric' s total assets in 1975 were $4.98
billion.
- In 1975 Western ranked 18th in sales and number 8 in
employees among U.S. industrial corporations.
- Western Electric is the largest manufacturer of tele-
communications equipment in the world.
* 64-70 per cent of total U.S. telecommunications
equipment market.
* 90 per cent of the Bell Operating Companies equipment
purchases
.
- Western sales were nearly $6.5 billion in 1975.
* $6.1 billion to BOC ' s
.
* $300 million to the United States Government.
* $41 million to subsidiaries.
* $26 million to other customers.
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Western Electric generally refuses to sell its product to
non-Bell telephone companies as a matter of corporate policy.
In view of this policy of not competing for independent tele-
phone business, the appropriate market for measuring concen-
tration with regard to Western is the Bell System market.
The Bell Operating Companies purchase over 90% of their
equipment through Western Electric. This gives WECO a
monopoly position in its relationship with the Bell Operat-
ing Companies
.
The structural configuration of the Bell System
presents serious economic as well as regulatory implications.
For example:
* how is the capacity and type of service offered
by AT&T dependent on the type of equipment introduced by WECO?
* how does vertical integration act to condition the
Bell System responsiveness to demand shifts and adjustments
to new technology?
* are market opportunities in the industry foreclosed?
* are there additional burdens of the regulatory
process?
It is apparent that vertical integration is a




The second main element of industry structure is pro-
duct differentiation. Bain states "...the degree of product
differentiation refers to or measures the extent to which
buyers differentiate, distinguish or have specific prefer-
ences among the competing output of various sellers in an
industry.
Unlike the automobile or aircraft industry, product
differentiation in the telecommunications industry has been,
for the most part, non-existent. Prior to the mid 1960 's
the only service in which carriers competed for business
was private line service (PLS) where AT&T and Western Union
offered competing interstate lines for high volume communi-
cations uses. Other than this market, which comprises a
very small aspect of the revenues realized by either, the
domestic telecommunications industry was characterized as
one where monopolists (the Bell System and Western Union)
provided a limited number of homogeneous communications
services. This homogeneity also extended into the ter-
minal equipment market. (Vertical concentration eliminated
much of the product differentiation in the equipment market
since Bell Operating Companies, GTE, United Telecommunica-
tions Inc., Continental Telephone Corp. purchased from
their respective manufacturing affiliate.) The terminal

equipment market was also foreclosed by regulating policies
which prohibited "foreign attachments" to telephone lines.
The revolution in computers and electronic technology
during the late 1950' s and early 1960 's generated a multi-
plicity of specialized communication needs, particularly in
two discrete areas - terminal equipment and private line
service (PLS) . This "technological revolution" coupled
with several decisions by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion in the late 1960's "...has produced both a plethora of
specialized requirements and a plethora of forms willing
78
and capable of supplying those specialized needs."
The old concept of two black telephones linked by lines
is no longer an accurate picture of the terminal equipment
market or services needed today. The limitations of switched
and private line telephone channels for data transmission
was recognized by AT&T.
The telephone network was developed for speech trans-
mission, and its characteristics were designed to fit
that objective. Hence it is recognized that the use
of it for a distinctly different purpose, such as
data transmission, may impose compromises both in
medium and in the specialized service contemplated.'"
In the terminal equipment market the question which the
Federal Communications Commission faced was whether to rely
on a few terminal equipment suppliers (the telephone com-
panies, Bell in particular) or open the market for a variety
of firms. In several key decisions the FCC "opened" the
7S

market for free competition, much to the dismay of the tele-
phone sector. Hundreds of different companies now build
80hundreds of different kinds of terminals. There are now
many specialized and innovative terminal devices available
to satisfy customer demands. One supplier could not have
met these heterogeneous communication equipment demands.
Vertical integration permits the operating companies of the
Bell and ITC's little choice; however the commercial and
government consumers can now decide which equipment meets
his needs and make cost quality trade-offs rather than en-
trusting those decisions to the telephone companies.
Approximately in the same time frame (late 1960's) the
FCC recognized the need for expansion in the private line
service and similar to the terminal equipment market, made
several important decisions which authorized competition in
the private line field. The reaction (conduct and perform-
ance) of the telephone sector, particularly the Bell System,
to this "new competition" will be discussed in later chapters
D. BARRIERS TO ENTRY
Barriers to entry are the advantages sellers have over
potential competitors, i.e. the disadvantages that new firms
face if they try to compete in an industry. In the tele-
communications industry the barriers to entry have included
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economies of scales, patents, absolute costs, produce differ-
entiation, and of course regulation which will be discussed
separately.
1. Economies of Scale
Economies of scale has been the "classic argument"
which the telephone sector has used to defend its position
as a "natural monopolist" in the telecommunications industry.
(Note:
One of the most unfortunate phrases ever introduced
into law or economics was the phrase 'natural monopoly.
'
Every monopoly is a product of public policy. No
present monopoly, public or private, can be traced
back through history in a pure form ... 'Natural
monopolies' in fact originated in response to a belief
that some goal or goals of public policy would be ad-
vanced by encouraging or permitting a monopoly to be
formed, and discouraging or forbidding future compe-
tition with this monopoly.) °1
A firm's short-run costs of production are classified
as fixed costs or costs that could be incurred if nothing
were produced by the firm, and variable costs or costs that
vary with the quantity of goods and services produced.
Figure 3-3 depicts the typical pattern of a firm's fixed
and variable costs. For a given size plant, fixed cost is
constant over the range of possible output quantity. Variable
costs change with increasing levels of output, but increase
at a decreasing rate at low quantities, levels off and then



























contribute to this behavior.) Figure 3-4 shows the corres-
ponding cost components per unit of goods or services pro-
duced. At very low levels of production, labor and other
variable inputs are operating at less than maximum effi-
ciency so that the average variable cost per unit initially
declines as production increases; marginal cost, the addi-
tional cost incurred with the production of one more unit
of output, is also declining over this range. The firm's
fixed cost declines over the entire range of possible pro-
duction, and average total cost (average variable cost plus
average fixed cost) declines until it reaches the minimum
point or most efficient level of output for this scale of
plant. (This is a common characteristic of many industries.)
Beyond the most efficient output level, variable inputs are
not so productive. The average total cost associated with
higher levels of production is higher than the previous level.
Over the long run, all costs are variable. New capa-
city can be added. The addition of new capacity or a
larger scale of operation, may result in a lower cost for
the most efficient level of output, i.e., increasing returns
to scales (Note: the most efficient level of output, in
studies concerning economies of scales, is subject to numer-
ous interpretations and controversy.), the same cost for
the most efficient level of output (constant returns to scale)
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or a higher average cost for the most efficient level of
output (decreasing returns to scale). Over the long run,
firms in most industries experience a family of average cost
curves with cost higher over very small sizes of plant,
leveling off over a range of sizes of plant and eventually
increasing as in Figure 3-5. Figure 3-5 depicts the above
in three phases, with the minimum optimal scale occurring
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In part, economies of scale determine the market
structure of an industry. If the minimum optimal scale is
large relative to the demand for an industry's output, the
industry will have fewer firms than the case where the mini-
mum optimal scale is small. If returns to scale increase
over all ranges of output, up to the size of the market,
then a "natural monopoly" or only one firm will exist; the
firm's family of short-run average cost curves and long-run
average cost curves appears as in Figure 3-6. Note that the
short-run minimum average cost, the point of optimal effi-
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The Bell System as well as the ITC's contend that
this last type of economies of scale exists; i.e., a non-
competitive market situation is determined by economies of
scale. Empirical evidence does not substantiate this argu-
ment; in fact, the FCC has done extensive studies in two
fti

areas -- the interconnect and private line service market --
and concluded that no large economies of scales actually
exists. (For example, see FCC Docket 20003.) However, an
extremely important fact is that this economies of scale is
a static concept; a given technology at a given point of
time is assumed.
Technological progress, a dynamic process, may alter
the optimal industry structure and change economies of scale
dramatically. John H. Landon addresses this very important
phenomenon below.
(Figure 3-7) ...demonstrates the potential impact
of changing technology, and changing knowledge of exist-
ing technology, on optimal industry structure. . . Panel
(a) illustrates the original equilibrium position.
Here the firm is quite correctly a natural monopolist...
the firm sees the falling costs over all relevant ranges
of output. In a purely static and certain world, the
firm would commit all of its resources to the construc-
tion of a single large plant. Additional firms would
have no incentive to enter the industry since entry at
a smaller scale involves a substantial cost disadvantage.
Government regulation may result from the market con-
centration enforced by this technology. Panels (b) and
(c) represent alternative possible situations in a sub-
sequent period. Panel (b) depicts a new ATC curve which
has evolved through technological change and results
in costs more nearly horizontal. There are in fact,
substantial diseconomies within the relevant range of
outputs... Entry is no longer precluded by the nature
of the technology and price will tend toward ATC unless
there are institutional barriers... Panel (c) t+ -'- shows
the original ATC t curve extended into regions of out-
put that were not explored in the initial period. A
shift in demand to the right to D' resulted in a scaling
up of production revealing the dotted rising cost seg-
ment... Further growth of industry sales will certainly
cause a division of the market among a number of plants






























Natural Monopoly at the Plant Level




Scenarios (b) and (c) both change drastically the
optimum scale of plant, the equilibrium structure
of the industry and the proper degree and kind of
governmental involvement in functioning of the in-
dustry... in both cases, moved from a natural monopoly
situation calling for concentration of output and
governmental regulation of price to a potentially more




The important question to be asked is: Which panel, (a),
(b) or (c) represents the telecommunications industry
accurately? Aspects of this question will be explored in
the conduct and performance chapters.
2. Patents
Patents create a 17-year barrier to entry for a
company which does not have the capital to develop an alter-
native design to an existing patent and will not or cannot
pay a royalty fee to the patent holder for non-exclusive
84
rights. If a company decides to pay royalty fees, it
raises its cost curve which increases the absolute cost
barrier to entry. As pointed out in an earlier section:
"Bell used the patent monopoly to establish itself in the
most lucrative urban markets, to develop a sound corporate
and financial structure and generally to secure a competi-
Q C
tively advantageous position." In the 1956 consent decree,
AT&T retained Western Electric in exchange for opening its
patent portfolio on a royalty-free basis; these patents
Ptfiproved to be a commanding asset. With competition emerging
84

within the telecommunications industry, patents may, in the
future, become significant barriers to entry.
3. Absolute Cost
Absolute cost barriers to entry are those factors
"...which make the production cost curve of a new firm lie
above that of a going concern.""' This is true for the
telecommunications industry as well as any other industry,
the difference being that in a "vertically integrated"
industry such as telecommunications, the spread between
curves is greater. Figure 3-8 shows the new firm's average
cost curve placed above the old firm's by a fixed amount.
In this case the new firm faces a cost disadvantage over



















Absolute cost barriers include: technological
innovation that the new firm does not have and must pay
for, i.e. patent rights to obtain valuable "know-how;" a
supply of significant input raw material which may be of
limited supply; and the cost of capital to a new firm.
Capital requirements become significant in the telecommuni-
cations industry, especially if the lending institutions
consider the entry of a new firm a high risk, or large
sums of money are required (this is true of domestic satel-
lite ventures) . The absolute cost barrier is a major
barrier to entry for potential telecommunications companies.
4. Product Differentiation
Product differentiation barriers to entry are also
significant. The Bell System has a "name" established with
the public. Most people associate its name with outstanding
service, quality equipment, etc. Traditionally its adver-
tising and sales promotion have been a minimum compared to
percentage of total sales. The new firm in the telecommuni-
cations market may have to sell at a lower price which means
he will have to keep advertising costs at a minimum or if he
charges the same price, he may spend more on advertising to
sell his product than the Bell System does. Figure 3-9






















The effect of product differentiation barriers is
similar to that of absolute costs barriers. Competition in
several markets of the telecommunications industry (inter-
connect and private line service) make product differentia-
tion another potential barrier to entry.
5. Regulation
The telecommunications industry is a regulated indus-
try. Unlike most industrialized countries which have nation-
alized their communications , the United States has relied on
private ownership, controlled by state and federal regulatory
commissions. The combination of private ownership and public
control directly shapes and conditions the structure of the
telecommunications industry. Regulation is a legal as well
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as economic concept, i.e. the telecommunications industry
is economically motivated as are other private enterprises,
yet they render a public service and, hence, are subject to
88detailed governmental regulation.
The tasks which regulatory agencies are required to
perform are not often easy. They are "...called on to inter-
vene in the economic process when the market grossly fails
to elicit acceptable economic performance by some criterion
or other . . . They must try to make the performance of the
regulated sector conform to those standards, without corn-
go
pletely controlling the regulated organizations ...."
The regulatory commission's task in the telecommunications
industry is even more complex because of selected competi-
tion within the regulated sector and on its perimeter;
ambiguous conditions and divided responsibility usually
result.
Public Utility Commissions (state regulatory agencies)
have authority over rate-making for all intrastate services,
including basic exchange, intrastate toll and terminal equip-
ment. The Federal Communications Commission has exclusive
jurisdiction over interstate service and terminal equipment
90
which affects the national communications network. The
effects of regulation on structure are apparent: the high
concentration in the industry -- historically regulatory
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agencies felt competition in the telecommunications industry
was wasteful, costly and inefficient; lack of product differ-
entiation influenced, in part, by the no "foreign attachment"
or "duplication" of services rulings by regulatory boards.
Barriers to entry in both an economic and legal sense have
been heightened due to regulation. The effects of regula-
tion in these structural elements will be apparent in the
conduct and performance of the telecommunications industry,
particularly the telephone sector.
E. THE OTHER SECTORS
Throughout this chapter, the telephone sector has re-
ceived most of the attention. Let us now briefly review
the remaining 3 per cent of the telecommunications industry.
With the exception of the telegraph sector, the inter-
connect companies (IC's), RCC's, and OCC's are experiencing
tremendous growth. The services and equipment which these
sectors represent threaten the "monopoly" position which
the telephone sector has long enjoyed. Spurred by recent
favorable decisions by regulatory agencies and also increased
technological progress, significant inroads, though small in
overall dollar amounts, are being made in the industry. It
is in these sectors, where competition is flourishing and
growing, that the direction of the industry will be determined
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1. The Interconnect Sector
Today, the interconnect sector of the telecommunica-
tions industry is made up of many firms which provide a
variety of terminal equipment to the telecommunications in-
dustry. A few examples of the wide variety of terminal
equipment supplied are listed below:
-Alpha-numeric display terminals
-Facsimile equipment
-Data terminals and computers
-Word processing systems
-Ancillary devices (i.e. alarms, automatic dialers)
-Medical telemetry equipment
-Environmental monitoring sensors
Although there are now many firms in the sector, the telephone
sector, i.e., Western Electric, still is the principal suppli-
er of interconnect equipment. The best estimates that can be
made on the size of the sector by the FCC (at the present
time there is no "industry-wide" trade association which
provides data on the make-up of this sector) is contained
in the following tabulation:







Estimated revenues from private branch exchanges
PBX's) and key telephone systems (KTS ' s) , the two
major products of the interconnect market, are
shown because revenue data for other products are
not available for the total market. These other
products, however, such as modems, repertory dialers,
and answering machines , are estimated (by the FCC) to
account for a relatively small part of the industry
in terms of revenues. Additionally, historical rev-
enue data for terminal equipment is available only
for the Bell System. Since Bell accounts for the
bulk of the revenues, however, it is significant to
show this data. In 1960 Bell revenues from terminal
equipment were $869 million; in 1965, $1.3 billion;
and in 1970, $2.1 billion. It should be noted that
in 1960 and 1965 no revenues were generated by the
interconnect industry, since this was the pre-
Carterfone period; in 1970, revenues from the inter-
connect market were probably less than $10 million. 91
The non- telephone companies accounted for only 4.46
per cent of total revenues from PBX and KTS, and less than
one-half of 1 per cent of the total revenues of the tele-
communications industry in 1975. ^
2. Other Common Carriers
The other common carriers comprise the following
groups
:
-specialized common carriers (SCC's)
-value added networks (VAN's)
-domestic satellite carriers (DSC's)
These OCC's provide voice, facsimile, data and other applica-
tions in public and private networks to the commercial and
government sectors. Figure 3-10 shows the geographical lo-






market, there were no revenues prior to 1969. The following
tabulation shows the number of OCC ' s firms, their operating
93
revenue and their amount of gross plant at the end of 1975.
Operating Revenues and Gross Plant
(in Thousands of Dollars)
No. of Operating Gross
Firms Revenue Plant
Specialized common
carriers 9 34,944 166,611
Value added carriers 2 20 3,020
Domestic satellite
carriers _3 16,300 205,000
Total 14 51,264 374,631
The OCC's accounted for about 0.1 per cent of the operating
revenues and about 0.3 per cent of total gross plant of the
telecommunications industry in 1975. 94
Briefly looking at each group of OCC's:
(a) Specialized common carriers (SCC's) consisted
of nine operational firms at the end of 1975. Table 3-4
shows the gross communications plant, operating revenues and
net income from SCC's. Except for Data Transmission Co.
(DATRAN) which filed for a petition of bankruptcy in August
1976, these SCC's are point-to-point microwave carriers.
They compete against the common carriers by offering a wide
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*( ) indicates loss
1/ Source: F.C.C. Form P, 1975
2/ Parent company is MCI Communications Corp.
3/ Leases all communications plant from MCI Leasing Corp.
4/ Operates as both a Specialized Common Carrier and a















Table 3-5 shows the operating revenues of the SCC ' s compared
with the private line operating revenues generated by the
95Bell System and the ITC s. As mentioned previously, the
SCC's only recently began generating revenues; in 1975 they
only accounted for 2.12 per cent of the total private line
revenues
.
(b) Value Added Network (VAN's) consist of only two
companies, Telenet and Graphnet. The VAN's are attempting
to serve a market where the user is seeking additional ser-
vice -- the added value -- to be superimposed by the carrier
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upon the basic transmission service.
(c) Domestic Satellite Carriers (DSC's) consist of
five firms
:
-Western Union Telegraph Co. (WESTAR System)
-RCA American Communications Inc. (SATCOM System)
-American Satellite Corporation (ASC)
-AT&T/GT&E System
-Satellite Business System (SBS)
RCA began operations in late 1973 and WESTAR and ASC in late
1974. AT&T/GT&E began service in late 1976 and SMS is still
in the development phase.
3. Domestic Telegraph
Western Union is the single carrier of message tele-




Operating Revenues: Telephone Company-
Private Line* and Specialized Common Carriers
(In Thousands of $)
1960 1965 1970 1975
Bell System 1/ $403,862 $543,766 $1,030,857 $1,479,473
Independent Telephone
Companies 2/ 14,872 36,782 80,439 133,103
Total Telephone
Companies 418,734 580,548 1,111,296 1,612,576
Specialized Common
Carriers 3/ - - - 34,944
Total $418,734 $580,548 $1,111,296 $1,647,520
* including intrastate private line.
1/ Statistics of Communications Common Carriers , 1960, 1965,
1970, 1975.
2/ Independent Telephone Company Statistics , 1960, 1965,
1970, 1975.
3/ FCC Form P, 1975.
96

TELEX/TWX, and private line service (PLS) including satel-
lite service (WESTAR System). Western Union's public message
(telegram) service has continued to decline for many years;
however, its operating revenue and gross plant continues to
grow as it expands into the private line service/satellite
communications service.
4. Public Land Mobile Radio Service
Public Land Mobile Radio Service is provided by the
telephone companies and other Radio Common Carriers (RCC's).
The companies provide mobile radio/ telephone service, paging
service and air/land service. Due to its small size, this
sector has almost no impact on the industry.
F . SUMMARY
A basic overview and description of the structure of the
domestic telecommunications industry, with emphasis on the
telephone companies (particularly the Bell System) , has been
presented. The telephone sector and particularly the Bell
System dominate "the telecommunications industry. They have
a monopoly on all local and toll telephone service in the
country and they also provide the majority of all other
telecommunications services in the United States. The tele-
phone sector accounted for 97 per cent of the operating rev-
enues and total communications plant in 1975; the combined
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operating revenues of the OCC ' s , interconnect, RCC ' s and
telegraph sectors, was only 0.5 per cent of the operating
revenues in the industry.
The telecommunications industry is highly concentrated
in the telephone sector which in turn is also highly con-
centrated among the Bell System and the three major inde-
pendents. (They account for 95 per cent of the market, as
measured by number of phones.) Vertical integration or
"vertical concentration" within these companies, enable
them to assume extreme market power; vertical concentration
also raises entry barriers by "foreclosing" parts of the
market. Until recently product differentiation has not
played a significant part and now only in a small portion
of the telecommunications market. Barriers to entry in
some areas are formidable (satellites), in other areas
relatively low (terminal equipment and private line service)
Lastly, regulation continues to be an important influencing
force in the industry. Competition is emerging in various
peripheral areas and is playing an increasingly large role
in determining the industry structure.
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IV. CONDUCT OF THE UNITED STATES
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
Richard Caves has stated in his book American Industry:
Structure, Conduct, and Performance , that market conduct
involves a firm's policies toward setting prices; its poli-
cies toward setting the quality of its product; and its
97policies aimed at coercing rivals. The conduct of the
domestic telecommunications industry concerns the aggregate
of acts, practices, and policies committed or employed in
arriving at its decisions of courses of action to take.
Obviously the structure of the industry has a direct influ-
ence on the conduct of the firms constituting the industry
and this influence can be seen in the behavior which the
firms exhibit in the telecommunications markets. This chap-
ter will consider the principal constituents of market con-
duct, as mentioned by Caves, and will attempt to illustrate
the interplay of the major participants in the markets. In
the research for this thesis, the authors have discovered
the difficulty in pinpointing specific causes for certain
actions taken by a company. Unlike the free market, the
telecommunications industry is heavily regulated and the
interplay of political, legal and economic elements sometimes

creates a maze of the justification or rationale for actions
undertaken by firms or dictated by the government. As best
as possible, the authors have attempted to identify root
causes and attribute them to the correct market stimuli.
1, Telecommunications Market Players
As noted in the history of the telecommunications
industry and in the concentration figures of Chapter Three,
market imperfection is characteristic of the industry. The
role of government at all levels cannot be dismissed in the
evolution and formulation of the telecommunications industry
existing today. In fact, it is proper to consider the reg-
ulatory bodies as active players in~market conduct as illus-
trated in Figure 4-1. This has especially been the case in
the post-"Above 890"/Carterfone/MCI era, from 1960 to the
present, as we shall see later in this chapter. Figure 4-1
shows by elementary set theory the interplay of the players
who are listed in Table 4-1. However by no means should
this be assumed to exhaust all of the possible scenarios
for interaction. It is shown to present a simple visual
pictureof the groups of companies, people, and regulatory












Existing U.S. Telecommunications Industry Market Players
REGULATORY/QUASI -REGULATORY BODIES
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the 50 States (Responsible for






National Association of Regula-
tory Utility Commissioners
(The National Lobby for State
PSC's)











Represented by the National Body
the U.S. Independent Telephone
Association
Specialized Common Carriers
Value Added Networks or Carriers
Domestic Satellite Carriers
Public Land Mobile Radio Common
Carriers




AT&T'S VERTICAL SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIP
WESTERN ELECTRIC Wholly-owned Manufacturing Sub'
sidiary of AT&T. Can be








Interconnect Companies ; Manu-
facture Terminal Equipment.
Unregulated by the FCC but
equipment must be certified
and registered with the FCC
if used for interstate purposes.
Manufacturing Subsidiaries of
ITC's. Relatively small when
compared to Western Electric
COMPUTER INDUSTRY
NUMEROUS FIRMS Shown to illustrate the narrow-
ing distinction between data
processing and data communications
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2 . Telecommunications Versus Teleprocessing
Of interest to note is the depiction of the computer
industry in the field of telecommunications players. To ex-
plain the reasoning behind this portrayal is worthwhile.
A teleprocessing system and a telecommunications
system differ mainly in their most important parameter,
their output - what they are supposed to deliver to
their users. The output of the teleprocessing system
is simply a data processing service, which can also be
defined as a data manipulation activity. In a tele-
communications system the objective is to transfer,
rather than manipulate, the data.^°
However fine a demarcation line the above definition
provides, it is still not enough because confusion continues
to exist. For instance, in teleprocessing schemes, tele-
communications exists when the remote user must get the data
to the CPU before computation occurs . Or in a number of
telecommunications systems, data must be manipulated to a
degree before it can be transferred, i.e., in a message
switching arrangement where the switches are minicomputers
with store and forward capabilities. Thus telecommunications
systems involve teleprocessing and vice versa in an ever
increasing number of "data communications" systems.
These problems were the basis for the first FCC
Computer Inquiry from 1966 to 1970 which declared that com-
munications common carriers could not offer data processing
services except through a separate subsidiary (to prevent
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cross-subsidization of competitive data processing services
with regulated telecommunications activities). Recogni-
tion of data processing functions incidental to message
switching was formalized but the FCC has recently announced
a new Computer Inquiry due to the fact that "technologi-
cal advances in computer hardware and software are blurring
the distinction between data processing and communications,
and make new definitions appropriate.' The important
point is that data processing can no longer be treated in
isolation from telecommunications ; the depiction of the
Computer Industry as a player in the telecommunications
markets underscores this fact and it is advisable to con-
sider the potential impact of competitive computer firms as
players in the telecommunications markets of the future.
B. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES /PRODUCT QUALITY AND
MARKET COMPETITION
The product of the telecommunications industry is tele-
communications services. Specifically people are interested
in the ability to send a message to a particular place at
a particular time. In the purest sense message content
should be of no concern to the transmission of the message,
but as mentioned previously in the introduction to this
chapter, due to considerations of significant message volume,
efficiency, and speed, the use of ancillary data processing
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equipment is recognized as part of many telecommunications
services where the meaning of the message remains unaltered.
The market for telecommunications services is itself a
point of discussion. Is the telecommunications industry one
market with multiple and varied services or is it several
markets each with a distinctive service of its own? Al-
though AT&T's Chairman, John deButts, argues that the tele-
communications industry is one market and that "what happens
anywhere in that market inevitably produces repercussions
elsewhere in that market,' the FCC argues otherwise,
maintaining the existence of a local exchange market; a long
distance telephone market; a private line service (PLS) mar-
ket; a terminal equipment market; a public switched tele-
typewriter market; and a public land mobile radio service
market. In this characterization of the industry, the local
exchange and long distance telephone markets operate under
monopoly franchises while the public switched teletypewriter
market is monopolistic, with the remaining three markets
being competitively nurtured by the FCC, especially in the
post-"Above 890"/Carterfone/MCI era. Based on the research
done for the thesis, the authors subscribe to the FCC view
of multiple markets within the industry, each with distinc-
tive services; however it should be pointed out that in many
instances, even in FCC documents, the substitution of
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"market" and "industry" is common and often without adequate
rationale. 103
An important caveat is necessary before beginning the
discussion of telecommunications services. The tariffed
offerings of the established common carriers, the SCC ' s
,
the RCC's, the VAN's, and DSC's, usually indicate various
conditions of the offered service, i.e., whether it is to
be a public or private tariff offering as indicated in the
introductory chapter, or whether the offering will be inter-
state or intrastate only. These additional delineations in
the types of telecommunications services offered, when con-
sidered with the multitude of suppliers of telecommunications
services and the varied users, illustrate the many different
possibilities of distinctive and unique services potentially
available. However, given the many services now available
in telecommunications markets (differentiated by such fac-
tors as the type of user, the specific supplier, and whether
the service is public or private, interstate or intrastate)
,
a degree of market substitutability exists, especially in
the PLS and terminal equipment markets. Dependent upon
whether the services are voice, record, or data, the offer-
ings of PLS by the common carriers and the equipment manu-
factured by the 1C ' s have become more common, with choice
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increasingly measured by cost, product quality, or product
differentiation.
Emphasis in this section will primarily concern the PLS
and terminal equipment markets. Since the competitive spurs
given to these two markets commencing in the 1960's by the
FCC, there has been a continuing debate within the tele-
communications industry over whether the "Above 890,"
Carterfone and MCI decisions have improved the quality of
telecommunications services and opened new markets of
service due to technological and managerial innovation.
In the following discussion of telecommunications services
and product quality, these questions will be highlighted.
1. Pre-"Above 890"/Carterfone/MCI
As explained in Chapters Two and Three, the estab-
lished common carriers have maintained a virtual strangle-
hold on the telecommunications markets enumerated above.
The only exception to this, prior to the 1960's, has been
the public land mobile radio service market where numerous
firms have existed since soon after the markets' inception.
The RCC ' s relatively minor operating revenues and total
communications plant indicate its still small state as a
market of telecommunications service and for that reason
discussion of RCC ' s will be minimal. During the pre-
"Above 890"/Carterfone/MCI period, the examples of
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telecommunications services and selected tariffs offered by
the established common carriers and the established terminal
equipment manufacturers (Western Electric and ITC subsid-
iaries) can be seen in Figure 4-2. Terms are explained in
i
Table 4-2.
Prior to 1960, the PLS and terminal equipment (inter-
connect) markets were primarily the domain of the telephone
companies and Western Union, and Western Electric respectively
Demand for PLS other than those services indicated in Figure
4-2 was not great; microwave technology did not arrive until
1946 and its use in PLS did not increase until the "Above
890" decision of 1959 and finally_the MCI Specialized Common
Carrier ruling of 1969. Prohibitions by AT&T on inter-
connection and the "cemented" relationship of Western Elec-
tric as the manufacturing subsidiary of AT&T were barriers
which effectively closed the interconnect market to other
firms, with the previously noted exception of the small
manufacturing subsidiaries of the ITC's* In sum, the PLS
and terminal equipment markets were non-competitive.
Price competition among the established common
carriers did not really exist in this period except for some
limited competition in the PLS market between AT&T and
Western Union where both common carriers offered competing
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Glossary of Typical Services /Equipments









Automatic Digital Network of DOD.
A PLS provided by Western Union.
Automatic Voice Network of DOD.
A PLS provided by AT&T and ITC ' s
.
Common Control Switching Arrangment.
Provides computerized control of
private line networks. Equipment is
located on the premises of the common
carrier unlike PBX. Along with FX,
CCSA accounts for over 40% of PLS
offered by AT&T.
Western Union service for medium speed
data transmission requirements.
Data communications device offered by
AT&T /Western Electric. IBM has charged
that it is in fact a data processing
device rather than a data communica-
tions device.
Dataphone Digital Service/Data Under
Voice. An offering by AT&T of digital
transmission services which makes use
of the lower portion of the microwave
spectrum of Bell microwave systems, to
transmit high speed data.
An offering by MCI Telecommunications
Corp. whereby a subscriber calls a
telephone in another city using MCI's
PLS microwave system in between and
local telephone exchanges at the end
to switch and complete the call.




FX Foreign Exchange service offered by
common carriers to business whereby
a user in one city can reach a business







A PLS offering by AT&T which attempted
to deaverage the uniform pricing policy
for lower-cost high density service
and higher-cost low density service in
order to prevent cream- skimming by SCC '
s
PLS offering by Western Union which per-
mits a customer needing service between
two specific locations to ring one end
without even dialing or signaling.
This saves time and no manual inter-
vention is required.
Offering of private line switched ser-
vice by RCA Americom, a DSC.
An offering of shared line and computer
switching services by Western Union





Key Telephone System. A terminal de-
vice offered by IC ' s . KTS ' s provide
for direct selection of an outside line
from a multiple telephone set. Func-
tions such as line holding and inter-
communication are selected at the instru-
ment. Visual indications are given as
to the status of each line associated
with the equipment.
The residential telephone service
offered by AT&T and the ITC's.
Contraction of the two words modulation
and demodulation. Equipment which re-
ceives a signal in one form and trans-
forms it into a signal in another form








Multi-Schedule Private Line Service.
The tariffed service offered by AT&T
as a replacement for its HI-LO tariff.
Message Toll Service. The basic long
distance service between local exchanges
and offered by AT&T and the ITC ' s
.
Private Branch Exchanges. Offered by
the IC's, they are terminal equipments
which allow for communications within
a particular location such as a building.
A typical PBX would be a switchboard
used by a business. PBX systems are
classified as small (up to 40 telephones)
;
medium (between 41 and 100 telephones)
;
and large (over 100 telephones)
.
Private Line Service. Provision of
specialized or leased line communica-
tions services through microwave,
satellite, value added or landline net-
works, as distinguished from public
exchange or long distance MTS. It is
point-to-point dedicated circuits for
specific uses.
Public Message Service. The telegram






A discount rate for bulk communications
offered by AT&T to attempt to blunt the
entry of SCC ' s into the PLS market.
A private line voice/data service
offered on Western Union's WESTAR
satellite system.
Switched Private Network Telecommunica-
tions Service. Offering by Southern
Pacific Communications Co. of PLS on
a shared basis to the user who does
not have enough volume to warrant a







Western Union's switched public
teletypewriter network.
AT&T's principal tariff response to
the entry of the SCC's into the PLS
market.
The teletypewriter exchange network of
AT&T acquired by Western Union in 1971,
The range of terminal services offered
by the IC ' s : from PBX, switchboards,
KTS , extensions, modems, to the basic
"black" telephone instrument.
WATS Wide Area Telephone Service. Offered
by AT&T; the user pays a flat fee for




"Other than in this market, which comprises only a very-
small part of the revenues realized by the Bell System
and Western Union, the domestic communications industry was
properly characterized in the mid-1960' s as one where monop-
olists provided a limited number of homogeneous communica-
tions services.'
As a corollary, most competition within the industry
could thus be characterized as non-price competition. The
alternative types of service offered by the common carriers
(voice, record, public message) ; the prohibitions on alien
connections to the Bell System; the vertical supplier rela-
tionship of Western Electric to AT&T; and the behind the
scenes coercion of new rivals and their financial backers
,
were the dominant non-price competitive elements exhibited
by the established common carriers.
Concerning quality of service, this period lacked
the price competition inducements to efficiency and relia-
bility which ordinarily ensure a sustained high level of
quality. As a result, product and service quality were
determined more by the supplier, rather than demanded by




2. Post-"Above 890 M /Carterfone/MCI
The late 1960's brought the reality of competition
to two select markets in the telecommunications industry.
The FCC, in its rulings and substantiations of the "Above
890," Carterfone and MCI cases, had concluded that the PLS
and terminal equipment markets were indeed supportive and
in need of competition. Essentially the FCC ' s reasoning was
that the ubiquitous black dial telephone instrument, the
symbol of telecommunications up to the 1960's, was no longer
able to serve as the sole answer to the growing communica-
tions needs of the country.
Technological developments outside of the telecom-
munications field were radically expanding the possible
applications of the telephone network through the use of
specialized terminal equipment, and in turn this created
demands for specialized PLS which could not or might not
be effectively provided over existing telephone company or
Western Union facilities. The technological development
which dwarfed all the others was the emergence of the
digital computer.
Accompanying this breakthrough in the design of
computers was a parallel revolution in electronics in general
The transistor, integrated circuits, and the minicomputer
offered sharp increases in computing power while also
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offering reductions in equipment cost:
It was clear by the mid-1960' s that the computers
and related technology had many potential applications
throughout the common carrier system. Thus the tech-
nological revolution that produced the demand for
specialized communications also produced many of the
solutions as well. *-
The proliferation of special requirements thus raised
questions in the FCC ' s mind as to whether it was in the pub-
lic interest to rely principally on a single terminal equip-
ment supplier (Western Electric) and the PLS offerings of
the established common carriers or whether the two markets
would be more efficient with the open competition of the
free market. As can be seen from the "Above 890',' Carter-
fone and MCI cases, the FCC opted for the latter alternative.
The responses of the established common carriers to
the FCC rulings in these three cases cited provide intriguing
reading, especially in light of the technological background
of this period. The opening of two previously closed mar-
kets to new IC ' s and SCC ' s produced many "protective"
responses by the established common carriers. The vertical
supplier relationship of Western Electric to the total
telecommunications market appeared headed for diminution.
Additionally, product strategy, quality, and differentiation
now would be more than just meaningless phrases. Whereas
marketing executives were non-existent or influentially
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insignificant before these three FCC rulings, their impor-
tance increased dramatically among the established common
carriers and Western Electric/ITC manufacturing subsidiaries
during the late 1960's.
a. Private Line Services
As can be seen in Figure 4-3, the selected
examples of PLS have grown greatly as compared with the
pre-"Above 890"/Carterfone/MCI period, and although the
vertical services offered by the IC ' s are essentially the
same as in Figure 4-2, the present terminal equipment market
has multiple firms, most of whom are independent of the
established common carriers, and produces more innovative
equipment. However the contrast in PLS is most striking.
The "Above 890" decision which permitted the private con-
struction and use of microwave facilities by private business
concerns was the real catalyst of the now burgeoning PLS
market, and provides a starting point for examining the
recent conduct of the PLS market.
AT&T introduced TELPAK in 1961 as a competitive
response to the private microwave alternative created by the
"Above 890" decision. It was a bulk service offering, dis-
counted, for private lines. It contained two rate elements:
a base capacity provided between specified points at a flat
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In other words, a private line user of 240
channels paid 15 per cent of the rate per channel charged the
user whose requirements were for 12 lines. The FCC ruled
on the lawfulness of these bulk discounts in 1964 and found
TELPAK and other PLS offered by the other common carriers to
be "like" communications services and that therefore any
justification of rate distinctions would have to include
showings that: (1) they are a competitive necessity; and
(2) they do not impose a burden on other users, i.e., the
rates for the service are compensatory by themselves and the
service does not rely upon revenues from other services such
as MTS, to meet operating expenses. ^ The result was that
the FCC ruled TELPAK A and B unlawful, seeing no competitive
need for them because the number of channels was too small
to justify a private microwave system. The FCC saw a competi-
tive need for TELPAK C and D but stated that AT&T had not
120

shown them to be compensatory. However the FCC allowed
AT&T to continue to offer TELPAK C and D pending submission
of data showing them to be compensatory or not. The ironic
fact is that as of late 1976 the same issue remained un-
resolved and AT&T was still offering the identical services,
although the rates had been revised several times. On
September 23, 1976, the FCC finally ruled in this matter
and found TELPAK C and D's rates to be unduly discriminatory
with PLS offered by other common carriers and ordered AT&T
to eliminate them and refile new bulk offerings within eight
months consistent with the guidelines delineated in the
Memorandum and Opinion Order of Docket 18128. (Note:
Although TELPAK was originally an AT&T offering, Joint TELPAK
with Western Union was established in 1968 following the
latter' s claim that it was about to lose crucial U.S. govern-
ment private-line business to AT&T's TELPAK. Within the DOD,
TELPAK is administered by DCA and lines are added or dropped,
as daily circuit requirements dictate, from a common pool
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of AT&T and Western Union PLS lines. The outcome of
Joint TELPAK, given the FCC's ruling in Docket 18128, re-
mains to be resolved.)
Another early response by AT&T in PLS offerings
was WATS which essentially provides discounts for intensive
users of the public switched telephone network in various
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geographical areas and is available on either a measured or
full time basis. The competitive necessity to offer WATS
was lacking since AT&T's Long Lines Department provides the
vast majority of long distance MTS in the U.S., however the
appearance of a new PLS offering such as WATS in the early
1960 's can be viewed as a marketing scheme to attract cus-
tomers. Recalling the "Seven Way Cost Study" of 1964, AT&T's
rate of return on its essentially monopolistic MTS and WATS
services were 10.0 per cent and 10.1 per cent respectively
whereas its rate of return on TELPAK, in the competitive PLS
market, was only 0.3 per cent. Western Union vociferously
argued then and SCC ' s continue to argue today as well, that
AT&T was subsidizing it's competitive market offerings
with its monopolistic services.
Additional PLS offerings by AT&T, precipitated
by the MCI decision of 1969 included Series "11,000" which
was a broadband service to allow innovative uses by users
requiring large contiguous bandwidths , and the Hi-Lo tariff,
introduced in 1973 as a response to the inter-city SCC ' s . To
understand the Hi-Lo tariff, one must realize that AT&T his-
torically has based its costs to consumers on the average
cost between higher cost-low denisty service and lower cost-
high density service. AT&T and the other established common
carriers claim that the SCC ' s have been able to "cream skim"
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the lucrative high density inter-city routes and still cover
their costs whereas the established common carriers must
also provide service in rural low density areas where unit
costs of service are incrementally higher. Thus AT&T's
Hi-Lo tariff was an attempt to deaverage its PLS charges
based on the route utilized. ' In January 1976 the FCC
ruled the Hi-Lo tariff rates unlawful and AT&T has recently
submitted its MPL service to replace it. MPL differs pri-
marily from Hi-Lo in the number of 1,Hi-Density" cities
identified and there are a few additional minor changes
also. 118
Further responses of the established common
carriers include such PLS services as DDS/DUV and Datacomm
although it might be more correct to say the technological
revolution mentioned earlier in this section was the spur
to these new services albeit they were hastened by the
advent of the SCC ' s . The DDS/DUV offering makes use of the
lower portion of the microwave transmission spectrum in
sending digital information under the voice channels of the
remaining portion of the spectrum. Western Union Datacomm
is likewise a digital PLS offering which seeks to obtain
businesses interested in the medium speed transmission of
data. Additionally, such unique services as INFOCOM and
HOTLINE /QUICKLINE strengthened Western Union's PLS offerings
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and when weighed with AT&T's PLS services and those of the
ITC's, represented a significant counter to the SCC's and
their PLS offerings sanctioned by the FCC.
The MCI decision in 1969 heralded a new era in
PLS. Soon thereafter and continuing to the present, the
SCC's, VAN's and DSC ' s have offered new and different PLS
ranging from EXECUNET, SPRINT, INSTANT Private Network,
SPACETEL and the various packet-switching schemes of the
value-added carriers. Businesses have increasingly come
to these new telecommunications carriers to satisfy their
increasing data/voice/record telecommunications needs. That
a market exists in PLS cannot be denied: one only has to
study the tenacious, varied responses of the established
common carriers since the early 1960 's in an attempt to
preserve their monopoly of PLS revenues. However the SCC's
in particular have experienced difficulty in the PLS market
and the reason(s) , although ostensibly clear, in actuality
may be more complex as indicated below.
DATRAN, a major SCC, filed for bankruptcy in
August 1976 and even though many analysts attributed its
119demise to undercapitalization, the established common
carriers will point to it as a vindication of their argu-
ment that the PLS market cannot stand competition. As a
further case in point, MCI, the SCC trailblazer, has recently
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been charged by the FCC with operating its EXECUNET PLS
offering as a public dial-up telephone service instead. ^
The prospect of MCI failing (EXECUNET is its major revenue
source) is enough to give pause to what the FCC ruled in
1969 when it created the SCC mini-industry and its PLS
market.
Actually the EXECUNET case focuses sharply on
a crucial problem of the PLS market: the original MCI de-
cision said only that SCC's would be authorized to offer
private line services without defining what a private line
was. Since then the SCC's have pushed for a broad defini-
tion while the established common carriers have lobbied for
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a narrow and restrictive definition. Thus perhaps the
FCC should offer an explicit description of the PLS market
it opened to competition seven years ago while simultaneously
perhaps the SCC's which remain should do a better job in
estimating the specialized telecommunications needs of their
private users; the SCC's should probably not simply pool
their requirements into a national PLS offering.
b. Terminal Equipment Services
Figure 4-3 illustrates the entry of new IC ' s into
the terminal equipment field, the entry being a direct result
of the FCC ' s Carterfone ruling of 1968. Whereas Western
Electric had been the single dominating firm in the terminal
125

equipment market since its purchase by American Bell (AT&T)
in 1881, the influx of new IC ' s in recent years has de-
creased Western Electric' s market share and 'loosened" the
syndrome that only Western Electric could supply terminal
equipment needs. In fact a major social benefit, that of
technical innovation, has accompanied the introduction of
mass IC competition. Although the vertical services enumer-
ated in Figures 4-2 and 4-3 are the same, the variety and
product differentiation are certainly more pronounced now
than ever, witness AT&T's "decorator phones" for example.
As an illustration of the effects of competition
among IC ' s , the following facts relating to data modems are
enlightening. In the mid-1960 's as computers became more
important in telecommunications and faster, the demand for
higher speed modems increased. Small IC companies responded
dramatically to this demand whereas the telephone companies
and their manufacturing subsidiaries responded more slowly.
For example, as early as 1965 a non-carrier IC marketed a
modem capable of data transmission speed of 4800 bits per
second (BPS) , but AT&T did not market a similar modem until
mid-1972. Similarly IC ' s marketed 7200 BPS and 9600 BPS
modems in 1968-69 whereas AT&T first marketed a 9600 BPS
1 ??
modem in 1974. The same types of examples exist with
respect to IC spurred innovation in the PBX and KTS terminal
1 o c

equipment sub-markets. In fact the developments in the
terminal equipment field made by both the established common
carriers and their manufacturing subsidiaries and the IC '
s
have been among the most far-reaching advances in the tele-
communications industry in the past decade, ranking along-
side the development of communications satellites. Indeed,
AT&T has encountered opposition to its DATASPEED 40 communi-
cations terminal device with the FCC claiming the "intelli-
gent terminal" device is "too smart" and performs prohibited
data processing services in violation of the 1956 consent
decree signed by AT&T (which among its clauses stated AT&T
could not enter an unregulated business such as data pro-
cessing) and the FCC ' s Computer Inquiry findings of 1970.
The resolution of the DATASPEED 40 case will probably await
the findings of the recently announced "new" Computer Inquiry
mentioned previously in section A. 2. of this chapter.
3. FCC Docket 20003 123
Docket 20003 is a recent investigation by the FCC
into the economic effects of competition in the PLS and ter-
minal equipment markets as well as jurisdictional separations
and rate structure procedures. Having lived with the Carter-
fone and MCI decisions for over seven years the FCC felt it
was necessary to take a close look at the PLS and terminal
equipment markets specifically addressing (1) whether the

existence of competition in the market for PLS and terminal
equipment has caused or is likely to cause a significant
loss of revenues by the telephone industry or an increase
in basic telephone rates; and (2) whether the beneficial
cross -subsidies (between telecommunications markets) claimed
by the telephone industry do in fact exist, and if so whether
they will be adversely affected by the presence of competition
-I r\ i
in the PLS and terminal equipment markets. In studying
the impact of competition within the PLS and terminal equip-
ment markets, relating to the telephone industry specifically,
the FCC asked three essential questions concerning each mar-
ket. An affirmative answer to any one of them would have
been grounds for invalidating the competitive actions in the
PLS and IC markets begun with the "Above 890" MCI and Carter-
fone cases respectively. The questions were:
1. Are there structural considerations in the market
which justify precluding competition? This question
includes the issue of economics of scale and the
implications of market diversity and incentives to
innovation.
2. Are there engineering constraints on the tele-
communications network that might preclude compe-
tition? Are there any reasons to expect a reduction
in network performance or reliability as a result
of competition?
3. Will competition cause such severe economic harm
to the telephone companies that the attainment of
policy objectives is seriously j eopardized? 125
128

Without delving into the rationale and reasonings
of the FCC, the regulatory body essentially upheld its prior
rulings in "Above 890"/Carterfone/MCI and found that compe-
tition in the PLS and terminal equipment markets had not
harmed the telephone industry but rather had contributed
to the well-being of the telecommunications industry as a
whole and should continue. In conjunction with Docket 18128,
which dealt with the PLS market in general and TELPAK C and
D specifically, Docket 20003 was a reaffirmation by the FCC
of the advantages of competition. With specific regard to
competition within the terminal equipment market, the FCC
found
:
no evidence in this docket of natural limitations
in supply such as economies of scale, substantial
economic barriers to entry or conditions of service
which would support a finding that there is a
natural monopoly in the provision of terminal equip-
ment or private communications systems. Moreover,
electric and gas utilities are in some ways similar
to telephone companies. In each case, the service
provided travels the lines of the electric or gas
company, and telephone company, to a terminal piece
of equipment. Electric and gas companies do not
normally supply the terminal piece of equipment . 126
In summary, certain identifiable benefits of compe-
tition in the PLS and terminal equipment markets have been
identified by the FCC: quality of service and the availa-
bility of new services has improved; lower rates for PLS
and terminal equipment users have resulted; and the estab-
lished common carriers have become more responsive to
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marketplace needs than when the PLS and terminal equipment
markets were basically within their sole domain. The social
benefit has been substantial in the FCC ' s opinion.
4. Thoughts on the Future of Market Competition
The PLS and terminal equipment markets as well as
the remaining four markets must confront several issues and
events in the near future, the resultant matrix of outcomes
having a profound shape on the future of telecommunications
market competition. These include the AT&T and USITA
sponsored CCRA which will have a decisive impact on the
SCC ' s and IC ' s if passed by Congress; the current Department
of Justice Antitrust Suit against AT&T seeking its breakup
and divestiture of Western Union, either or both of which
would have potentially cataclysmic repercussions in all the
telecommunications markets; the portentous presence of SBS
in the DSC field which eventually might become the vehicle
behind which IBM achieves a significant share of future
telecommunications markets; and lastly the ongoing FCC
Computer Inquiry which must arrive at a workable distinction
between data processing and data communications to permit
the most efficient cooperation between the regulated tele-




C. PRICE DETERMINATION/RATEMAKING PRINCIPLES
An understanding of the means of price determination for
services in the telecommunications industry is necessary to
appreciate the arguments posited by the common carriers and
the FCC for interstate services and the common carriers and
state public service and utility commissions for intrastate
service, with regard to price adjustments within individual
telecommunications markets.
Under the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC is tasked
to determine the revenue requirements of a common carrier in
order to provide interstate services while the state regulatory
bodies are tasked to determine the revenue requirements of
those common carriers engaged in intrastate services. The
revenue requirement is an estimate which is designed to just
cover the carrier's costs and to allow reasonable dividends
and interest payments that will attract new capital. 127 Two
important concepts integral to the formulation of a common
carrier's revenue requirement are the rate base and the rate
of return. Appendix A contains a detailed explanation of
their relationship in arriving at the common carrier's total
revenue requirement. After the revenue requirement is formu-
lated, the rate schedules for the various telecommunications
services offered by the common carriers are devised so as to
realize the total revenue requirement of the common carrier;
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these schedules are then embodied in the tariffs filed with
the applicable regulatory agency.
1. The Rate Base and Rate of Return
As a reading of Appendix A will illustrate, the
revenue requirement of a common carrier depends greatly
upon (1) the rate base and (2) the rate of return. In fact,
the FCC and state regulatory bodies prescribe the rate of
return by administrative decree with the intention of having
it reflect as nearly as possible the cost of capital.
If the regulatory body selects a rate of return
that is too low, the economic well-being of the
carrier is jeopardized. If the regulatory body
picks a rate of return that is too high, the public
rate-payers suffer excessive rates and the carrier
is unjustly enriched. -*-^°
The futility of rate of return regulation becomes
readily apparent when the fundamental objective of regula-
tory enterprise is considered: the effort to limit the rate
of return while consumer demand and lack of competition
129guarantee a minimum profit on the rate base. Thus the
minimum profit, or rate of return, induces a wide range of
behavior patterns from the common carriers to expand the
rate base, thus creating additional revenue above that
necessary to cover operating expenses and satisfactory
dividends. These behavior patterns have been modeled by
Averch and Johnson and the methods cited include the
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following examples: (1) slow depreciation expenses, i.e.,
straight-line versus accelerated; (2) lax procurement prac-
tices; (3) building in excess capacity; (4) choosing more
capital-intensive technology than necessary; (5) owning equip'
ment, vehicles, and buildings when leasing would be cheaper;
and (6) setting excessively high standards of performance,
quality and reliability even if nominal, which pleases regu-
lators and consumers who are unaware of the increased rates
entailed. 1 -*-1- Although the Averch-Johnson model has been
widely applied, significant disagreement exists as to its
validity in whole or in part by such theorists as Kahn,
1 O O TOO 10/
Baumol and Klevorick. ' ' The disagreement centers
around the fact the model has never been empirically proved.
The first of these practices cited, slow depreciation
expenses, is an extremely involved issue encompassing histori-
cal accounting methods, political issues, and technological
innovation. The standard system of accounts imposed by regu-
latory agencies, allows many charges which non-utility
companies would write-off as current expenses, to be capi-
talized and written-off over long periods. Thus AT&T can
show a moderate 6 to 8 per cent return on capital which
contrasts sharply with a 27 to 30 per cent pretax profit on
revenues. It is like Social Security according to one
FCC accountant: "capitalizing so much and depreciating it
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slowly just postpones the costs.' To accelerate deprecia-
tion costs however would increase operating expenses of the
common carriers and require politically unpopular rate
increases. Thus the economic replacement function lingers
on unresolved: long depreciation periods widen the gap
between the higher cost of replacing worn-out equipment and
the funds generated in depreciation reserves.
"
The fact that the revenue requirements of the common
carriers are figured in the aggregate, for all services
offered, also poses a further problem with the rate base
and the rate of return regarding the prices charged for
specific services. Simply stated, if a monopolist or a
company exhibiting monopolistic tendencies can set prices
arbitrarily for specific services as long as the overall
rate of return matches that set by the regulatory agencies,
then that firm can raise the prices charged for certain
services far above cost in order to subsidize below cost
pricing of services otherwise unable to pay for themselves.
This cross -subsidization was evident in the "Seven -Way Cost
Study" mentioned previously and will be discussed later in
this chapter.
Thus it is evident that in the regulated telecommuni-
cations industry, close supervision by regulatory bodies is
essential in order to prevent the specter of "mushrooming"
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rate bases and the general problem cited earlier of the
frustration of rate of return regulation. With respect to
AT&T, the FCC has made several serious attempts to deal
with both the rate base and the permissible rate of return.
These efforts began in 1965 with the General Telephone In-
vestigation, and have continued up through February 1976
being successively divided into various phases, absorbed
into new FCC Dockets, or culminating in temporary limits
on the rate of return. Figure 4-4 traces this meandering
trail of FCC Dockets and decisions which currently permit
an overall rate of return for AT&T of 9.5 to 10.0 per cent
138depending upon efficiency improvements. The delays and
offshoot investigations reflected in this eleven year record
directly demonstrate the difficulty of small regulatory
staffs attempting to apply the equations of Appendix A to
such large corporations as AT&T. Although all the decisions
for rates of return shown in Figure 4-4 were with specific
reference to AT&T, the FCC states that it is general practice
for the other common carriers to change their tariffs
1 39
accordingly.
It can be readily seen that as a competitive surro-
gate, the FCC ' s and state regulatory agencies' oversight of
the regulated telecommunications industry is bereft with prob-
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One only has to read the sensational experiences of James
Ashley's employment with AT&T and the rate increase efforts
of Southwest Bell to realize the shenanigans that can occur
given the rate of return regulatory climate. Texas, the last
state without a state public service body to oversee utili-
ties, now has one as a result of Ashley's disclosures.
2. Pricing Philosophy
The Communications Act of 1934 does not state so
explicitly but virtually all parties involved in the tele-
phone industry and its regulation agree that it carries the
implied mandate of "universal service." For this reason
the effects of competition in the telecommunications indus-
try's PLS and terminal equipment markets can have a definite
influence on the pricing of basic residential telephone
service.
Under this assumed mandate, AT&T has espoused a
"value of service" concept which seeks to place a higher
cost for telephone service upon business customers than upon
residential customers. That such a philosophical opinion
should emanate from the corporate headquarters of AT&T and
the ITC ' s is indeed questionable but it is a fact that the
"value of service" concept has held down household telephone
bills and enabled the Chairman of AT&T to claim that "there




pays the full cost of his phone service.' And for sure,
telephone service is within the reach of most people in the
U.S. today: at the end of 1976, AT&T had 123.1 million
"I/O
telephones in service; including the ITC's, the U.S. had
149 million telephones in service or 69.5 telephones for
every 100 people.
Another pricing concept practiced by the telephone
common carriers, and specifically AT&T, is average pricing,
whereby the telephone charge to any residential exchange
customer is the same regardless of whom or where he is calling
Again this is an example of a philosophical decision reached
by AT&T, but which it can afford to do as a monopolist in the
long distance telephone market. Yet this concept faces a
serious challenge when confronted with an SCC ' s competitive
PLS offering. The FCC, by its MCI decision,
...has permitted newcomers to the phone business
to operate private-line service between major cities
in competition with Bell System long-distance ser-
vice. Our basic objection is that these competitors
have moved into the heavy-traffic routes and cut
prices. They can do that because we have tradition-
ally charged more on these routes, relative to cost,
than on more remote routes where traffic isn't so
heavy. In effect, our competitors have skimmed the
cream off the heavy intercity business by picking
and choosing the areas they want to serve. We have
to stand ready to serve customers not only in major
cities but everywhere else in the U.S. ^





' s , and also terminal equipment manufacturers has clearly
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concerned all the established common carriers and can be
seen in such relatively new pricing responses as the now
defunct Hi-Lo tariff and its successor, MPL, and also in the
plan of AT&T to institute usage sensitive pricing (USP) , a
unit pricing method, for all local and long distance tele-
phone calls nationwide by 1980. Designed to more accur-
ately reflect costs, AT&T will be able to determine the
caller's station, the duration of the call and its distance
by means of its new electronic switching systems (ESS) . Thus
there appears to be a move towards cost-related pricing which,
when it occurs, will substantially curb the practice of all
the established common carriers denoting service offerings
by either their contributions (excess of revenues over cost)
or subsidies (excess of costs over revenues) and the result-
ing necessity for cross-subsidization.
3. FCC Docket 18128 147
The prevention of predatory pricing by the established
common carriers who are able to cross-subsidize competitive
PLS with their essentially monopolistic services, requires a
solid, accurate definition of the cost of each service offered
and a regulatory means of administering such a definition.
To project revenues from a given common carrier's service
offering in order to see if it will be compensatory (cover
its costs) and therefore a contribution to overall revenue,
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is a most difficult task for the FCC or a state regulatory
body - more difficult than determining the overall revenue
requirement. The main reason for the difficulty is that a
choice must be made between two fundamentally different
versions of cost: fully distributed cost (FDC) and long run
incremental cost (LRIC) . The aim of defining the cost of a
telecommunications common carrier's specific service offer-
ing was the reason behind Docket 18128, the Private Line
Rate Case.
Very simply stated FDC methodology requires that a
new service offering share the common cost of land, equip-
ment, buildings, and personnel, in addition to the incre-
mental costs incurred in these factors due to the
institution of the new service. LRIC, on the other hand,
just requires that the whole incremental cost of the new
service be covered so that users of the new service will
not "burden" users of other services: they pay solely for
the incremental costs.
AT&T, in particular among the established common
carriers argued for the LRIC methodology based upon sound
business practice:
No business, regulated or unregulated, uses a rigid
FDC approach in setting prices for its goods and
services. They do not use FDC because it cannot tell
them what it costs to provide a product or service,
whether it will sell or not at the price indicated,
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what the profit to the firm would be, what price
will yield the optimal volume of business, or any
of the other information relevant to sound busi-
ness and economic pricing.
A going business with more than one product or
service to sell, in deciding whether to offer a
new service, will ask a threshold question "Will
my business be better off by offering the service,
or not?" An FDC approach cannot provide an answer
to that question since it is no more than an ar-
bitrary allocation of historical costs. Techniques
such as the long run incremental analyses estab-
lished as being economically sound by the record in
this proceeding, are the only techniques which can
answer such a question. ^°
The decision by the FCC in Docket 18128 however
went against AT&T. The FCC stated that although LRIC would
probably be the proper methodology in a competitive, ration-
al decision-making environment, it would be extremely easy
for a regulated common carrier to mask some of the actual
LRIC behind monopoly services or common costs and thus still
underprice SCC ' s , VAN's and DSC's in the PLS market. Also,
the FCC stated that its small staff would be hard pressed
to find such manipulations if they did occur and that addi-
tionally, its present accounting system does not segregate
costs by service, so that monitoring the LRIC of individual
service offerings would be difficult at best. For these
reasons, the FCC adopted the FDC methodology of pricing
in Docket 18128. Additionally,
...the Commission held that AT&T may not price its
basic telephone monopoly services above the allowable
overall interstate rate of return -- in other words --
1A1

the prescribed overall interstate rate of returns
for AT&T will also be the ceiling for MTS and WATS
rates. Moreover, the competitive private line
services must be priced to earn at least their
authorized interstate rate of return within a
reasonable period of time.
. .
.The ceiling for monopoly service rates and the
floor for private line service rates are necessary
to protect the ordinary telephone ratepayer from
effectively subsidizing Bell System ventures in the
competitive private line field. Sufficient flexi-
bility, however, is built into private line pricing
to accomodate legitimate pricing approaches by AT&T
which are intended to build up a market that ulti-
mately will prove capable of earning overall inter-
state rate of return. ^^
D. GOVERNMENT REGULATION
As can be seen from the history of the telecommunica-
tions industry related in Chapter Two and from the imprint
that regulatory bodies have had on the industry's structure
and conduct, government regulation is a hallmark of the
industry. It is axiomatic that since telecommunications
common carriers are public utilities they will exist in an
environment of regulation. The difficult part, as elaborated
in this thesis, is that the regulatory process is one of
extreme balance.
Regulatory agencies attempt to prevent the firm
from employing its monopoly base to levy extortionate
prices from the subscribing public. At the same
time, the agency endeavors to allow the firm suffi-
cient revenues to compete in the capital market.
But identifying the interest of the firm and the




The balance referred to above is one of the reasons for
the number of regulatory/quasi-regulatory agencies acting
as players in the telecommunications markets. In the exec-
utive branch of the federal government alone, three agencies/
departments (FCC, OTP, Department of Justice) have a direct
influence on the course of the telecommunications market's
structure, conduct and performance. The FCC is chartered by
the Communications Act of 1934 to regulate interstate and
foreign communications common carriers. OTP was created in
1968 in order to provide advice to the President on national
telecommunications. The Department of Justice, in its pur-
suit of antitrust violations, continues to have a profound
impact on the behavior patterns of all the telecommunications
common carriers. It is significant to note that the FCC,
specifically through its rulings, and OTP, in general through
its policy statements, have usually agreed during the 1970 's
that the competitive aspects introduced in the telecommunica-
tions industry .have been beneficial. Further, the mere
charge of "monopoly" by the Department of Justice demonstrates
its continuing vigil to maintain regulation as a viable and
effective substitute for pure competition. If all three
entities were called upon to vote in the upcoming Congress-
ional debate on the CCRA bill, in the authors' opinion, all
would probably vote "nay," a direct rebuke to AT&T and USITA.
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On the state regulatory level, an AT&T-NARUC axis is
151
sometimes alleged. Indeed, state public service or
utility commissions and NARUC have generally opposed the
FCC's Carterfone and MCI rulings. 152 ' 153 Their contention
is that the FCC was attempting to regulate intrastate as
well as interstate PLS and terminal equipment matters in
violation of FCC's charter. This opposition is not to be
dismissed lightly either since state regulatory agencies
regulate more than two -thirds of the telecommunications




However the-U.S. Court of Appeals Telerent decision of
April 1976 asserted the FCC's pre-emptive jurisdiction over
terminal equipment and re-enforced the FCC's competitive
initiatives in the terminal equipment market. The Court
stated that although the terminal equipment might only be
connected for intrastate purposes, it is connected to an
interstate telecommunications network. Thus in the ter-
minal equipment market, states must now subscribe to FCC
standards for terminal equipment interconnection. This has
permitted more use of customer owned and supplied equipment
in consonance with the intended purpose of Carterfone.
It therefore seems generally apparent that spearheaded
by the FCC, the federal government is successfully orchestrating
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competitive initiatives in the terminal equipment and PLS
markets with further prospects for competition dependent
upon the outcome of the current antitrust suit brought by
the Department of Justice against AT&T and the CCRA pre-
sently before the Congress.
E. OVERVIEW
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the telecommunica-
tions industry is composed of many markets, many of them
interrelated and with a degree of substitutability. The
"set" of telecommunications market players illustrated in
Figure 4-1 is certainly not static but rather dynamic, the
degree of change determined by such things as federal or
state regulation, technological innovation and market per-
formance by individual players. Several things to watch
as far as ultimately changing the make-up of the "set" are
the outcome of the new FCC Computer Inquiry and the success
or failure of the SBS DOMSAT entry spearheaded by IBM. The
ultimate resolution of data processing with data communica-
tions within the telecommunications industry is the biggest
"unknown" presently confronting its future. A cause for
optimism is the recent success of Western Union, once labeled
the "sick carrier" of the industry, in acquiring two new
large governmental contracts operating over a period of years
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(1) a DOD update of AUTODIN called "AUTODIN II" 157 and (2)
a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) con-
tract to develop a tracking and data relay satellite system,
the largest NASA contract ever awarded for an unmanned space
mission.
If one factor stands out among all others to the authors,
it is the diversity of services offered which makes regula-
tion so difficult. It is the multiservice common carrier,
established or specialized, which makes the regulation of
the industry so difficult.
If AT&T offered only one service produced by one
machine, regulation would be easy. It is the
diversity of products and the increasing complexity
of services resulting from competition which breeds
further problems. When is a private line service
really message toll - when it allows switching
between two firms, or among four firms? When is
telecommunications in essence data processing -
when the phone company reads a meter, adds up two
numbers, prepares a bill? When is AT&T acting in
response to competitive pricing and when is it
acting as predator, cutting prices below costs and
driving competitors out of business? -*--)
"
The future will certainly bring an increase in the range
of new and different services offered by the telecommunica-
tion common carrier. The industry's regulation and yard-
sticks of performance will become even harder to measure.
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V. PERFORMANCE OF THE UNITED STATES
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapters, an overview and description
of the structure and conduct of the domestic telecommunica-
tions industry has been presented. This chapter examines
some of the important aspects of the industry's performance.
Full appraisal of the telecommunications industry's perform-
ance is difficult because performance has many dimensions.
Bain suggests six general criteria or measures for judging
performance:






Caves defines performance "as the appraisal of how much the
economic results of an industry's market behavior deviates
from the best possible contribution it could make to achiev-
1 f> 1
ing these goals." This chapter will concentrate on the
first four criteria, product performance and technological
progress, selling cost, allocative and technical efficiency;
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due to their scope, full employment and income distribution
will receive only a cursory comment.
Both Bain and Caves mention, as a major obstacle in any
study of market performance, the lack of data and empirical
evidence on the various industry groups in the United States.
The authors found this, for the most part, to be true in
their attempts to evaluate the performance of the tele-
communications industry. However in recent years, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has held extensive
hearings concerning the economic aspects of the telephone
sector, in particular the Bell System. Since the Bell System
accounts for over 80 per cent of all business in the industry
and almost all the data available relates to the Bell System,
the major part of this chapter will look closely at the
performance of AT&T, the Bell Operating Companies, Western
Electric (the manufacturing arm) and the Bell Telephone
Laboratory (the research and development arm)
.
A second obstacle in judging the performance of an in-
dustry is the lack of a performance standard or "norm."
(Again, both Bain and Caves point out the inherent diffi-
culties of establishing such a performance standard) . In
evaluating the performance of the telecommunications industry
the authors found two disparate performance standards:

1. A "paper test" benchmark, offered by the Bell
System. The performance of the telephone companies should
be judged against price comparison studies, productivity
studies and management consulting studies provided by the
telephone companies.
2. A "market test" benchmark, created by competition
in two areas, the equipment manufacturing market (commonly
referred to as the interconnect market) and the private line
service (PLS) market.
Drs . Baumol, Eckstein and Kahn discuss the benefits of
competition as follows in their paper, "Competition and
Monopoly in Telecommunication Services":
Economists have generally been predisposed to
favor competition as a form of organization for an
industry. They usually have taken this position not
primarily because they feel that competition is
desirable in and of itself but because they believe
that it offers a number of important advantages. It
gives greater scope to individual independence and
freedom, creates more centers of power and avoids the
political risk of excessive concentration of economic
power. In economic terms, it offers three basic bene-
fits to consumers
:
a. pressures for rapid innovation,
b. pressures for maximal product quality at
any given selling price,
c. pressures to supply the service at minimum




Without further review of the arguments for competition,
the authors agree with the stated position above and the
FCC that a "market test" benchmark based on competition
was an appropriate standard to examine the Bell System's
performance, provided that competition actually exists.
A third obstacle encountered concerned the role of both
state and federal regulatory agencies. As mentioned by
Charles Phillips Jr., political and other forms of pressure
often force these agencies to judge performance by criteria
which differ somewhat from an economist's point of view.
For instance, they may put undue importance on such dimen-
sions as stability and continuity. Because of the very
nature of their work, regulatory agencies must share in
the responsibility of the industry's performance. Since
there is no data available on their performance, it is
difficult to draw conclusions on how well the industry is
actually performing.
Before our examination begins , a final point should be
made. It is not the intent of the authors to pass a good
or bad judgment on the industry's performance. Indeed, the
Bell System has provided the United States with, what most
people believe to be the finest telephone system in the world
After a six-year study, the Federal Communications
Commission concludes that the American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. is providing 'excellent' telephone service
at a reasonable cost to the public. °^
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Rather, the authors' intent is to look at the industry's
actual performance, particularly the Bell System and see
how this performance compares to the "market test" of
competition.
B. PRODUCT PERFORMANCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
Bain defines product performance as:
how well the firms engaged design, determine the
quality of, vary, differentiate, and progressively
improve their products - all relative to that perform-
ance in these several regards which would achieve the
best attainable balance between buyer satisfaction and
the cost of production or, to what extent could the
relationship of buyer satisfaction to the cost of pro-
duction be significantly improved by lowering or raising
quality, altering design, increasing or decreasing the
real variety of quality or design among competing
products, changing products more or less frequently
and so forth.
"
As can be seen from the above definition, product per-
formance itself, is multi-dimensional and difficult to
define exactly. In examining product performance the
authors relied primarily on data from the FCC, In the
Matter of American Telephone and Telegraph and the Associ -
ated Bell Companies Charges for Interstate Telephone Service
,
Docket No. 19129. The FCC used a case study approach to
analyze numerous products in three major areas:





One aspect will be examined - the subscriber equipment market
which is part of the customer's equipment and service area.
(Similar results were observed by the FCC Trial Staff in
the other areas.)
The subscriber equipment markets consist of people who
require telephone equipment on their premise. The equipment
may be a data modem which enables computers to "talk" to
each other over telephone lines; it may be an office switch-
board - a PBX; it may be a telephone instrument linked to
extensions - Key Telephone Systems; it may include antique
telephone sets, speakerphones or automatic dialing units.
Prior to the Carterfone decision in 1968, the subscriber
equipment market belonged exclusively to the Bell System.
They did not allow direct connection of privately manufactured
or privately owned equipment onto the switched network.
Direct connection of privately manufactured equipment was
allowed to private lines since they did not transverse the
public switches. The Bell System pricing and marketing
policy during the pre-Carterfone era according to Mr. D. J.
Mathews, AT&T Manager of Planning and Support was:
to provide the best possible service at the lowest
possible cost. A market strategy that supports this
objective indicates an 'anywhere, anytime, anything'
service posture. It further shows that development
is paced by corporate priorities as opposed to market
requirements. This type of strategy maintains that
the monopolistic position of the Bell System tends to
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drive out any competitive threat. The pricing policy
in support of this approach is to price low and in
such a way that total revenues cover total costs.
Pricing strategies for this period show them to be
in consonance with the basic policy.-'-"'
A subscriber was limited to one choice: lease an end-to-
end service, a service that included line, switching and
telephone instruments from the Bell System or lease nothing.
For all practical purposes, equipment competition was non-
existent. 168
In 1968, as a consequence of the FCC ruling in the
Carterfone case, the subscriber was given an opportunity to
lease non-Bell equipment. The Bell System response to the
"new" subscriber equipment market can be characterized as
2(TL) - "Too Little, Too Late." For the first time, com-
parison between Bell Telephone Laboratory (BTL) /Western
Electric equipment and non-Bell equipment could be made
with products being evaluated on their price, their quality,
their cost and their merits; subscribers were now free to
purchase non-Bell equipment, creating what is now called
the interconnect market. A "market test" benchmark to
examine performance had emerged. This competition pre-
cipitated a response from the Bell System which provided
the rate payer and user with better products, lower costs,
169
new features and shorter development schedules.
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Typically, the Bell System's reaction to the new IC compe-
tition followed a definite pattern:
1) The subscriber buys non-Bell equipment, thus
eroding the operating companies' rate base and
diminishing Western Electric' s market share.
That erosion prompts a reappraisal of Bell pro-
ducts by the Bell System.
2) AT&T must decide to buy a new general trade
product or manufacture its own. AT&T is confronted
with a classic make /buy decision. Invariably AT&T
decides to "make."
3) Bell pursues stop-gap measures: the operating
companies buy non-Western products on an interim
basis but AT&T informs them that a new Western
Electric product is forthcoming.
4) New equipment is introduced on an expedited
basis
.
5) Non-Western Electric ^products serve as a cost
and price target for BTL/WECO. Sometimes equip-
ment is redesigned to meet or beat the visible
target established by general trade suppliers.
6) Western Electric delivers its products to Bell
operating companies experiencing the most intensive




7) The operating companies buy untested Western
Electric equipment born in haste. Sometimes
operating companies experience problems of cost,
quality and/or reliability with such equipment. ™
In almost every instance, the above reaction pattern was
observed by the FCC Trial Staff. Looking at it in more
detail:
First, the subscriber buys non-Bell (or non-Western
Electric) equipment because of better price, features, avail-
ability, etc. This erodes the "exclusive market" enjoyed by
the Bell System. For example, in the common user data set
market, competitors had captured 18 per cent of it by 1972.
Bell's share loss leads to introspection and appraisal as
evidenced by remarks from top management at AT&T:
* Now, data set development is a relatively short
process, but would you believe it takes an average
of five years between conception and function.
That's longer than it takes an elephant ! 172
* Broad comparisons of cost, size and features of
Bell System and competitive devices indicated
need for more variety in our PBX line for small
to medium users. '3
* Bell Labs is too slow to be competitive with data
modem technology. '^
* We have allowed our competitors to get 7-10 years
ahead of us in design of data modems. '^
In this reassessment process, the Bell System determines its
product line is not competitive.
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Second, the Bell System is faced with a classic make or
buy decision. In almost every case examined by the FCC, Bell
chooses the latter and begins development.
* Development of 5 new data sets was undertaken
because Bell determined that they clearly intend
to remain in the data business. '°
Third, the Bell Operating Companies purchase the non-
Bell equipment on an interim basis.
* The urgent need has prompted a recommendation to
the operating companies to purchase outsiders
suppliers systems... ''
Fourth, the Bell System develops and introduces new pro-
ducts on an accelerated basis.
* The 812A (data modem) development was initiated on
an expedited basis. 178
Fifth, the Bell System uses competitor products as a
cost and price target.
* With the new proposed data modem developments BTL
and Western can meet the competition toe-to-toe-
cost and features. 179
Sixth, the Bell Operating Companies press Western Elec-
tric for new products on a high priority basis.
* Operating companies observed 'spending money some
place else' was the best way to get AT&T, BTL and
Western's attention. °®
Seventh, the Bell Operating Companies buy Western Elec-




* Having been burned too often, the Telcos simply
do not believe AT&T/BTL price and availability-
estimates . -L° 1
Not every product made by Western Electric followed the
above pattern exactly; however, for the most part, in the
cases which the FCC examined, this pattern repeated itself
again and again. The "market test" benchmark also allowed
the Bell System to judge itself. It showed Western Electric
that its product line was inadequate, its prices were high
and where its equipment lacked features. It let Bell Tele-
phone Laboratories know that its product development was
lagging, its priorities were skewed and where certain areas
of technology had the wrong emphasis.
To their credit the Bell System met the challenge with
the following results:
-- new products were introduced
-- development time shortened
-- costs were reduced
— obsolete products were dropped
-- new features were introduced
1 ft?
-- new tariffs were filed. °
However, overall, using the market test - competition - as a




Technological progress refers to "how well an industry
does" in the matter of invention (discovery) and innovation
(actual applications of new discoveries) . Bain asks the
question: "Are they 'adequately' or ideally progressive
in developing and applying new techniques and thus con-
tributing to increased productivity of the economy? "183
How to determine the technological progressiveness criterion
of performance in an industry is difficult. Bain states
several ways we should evaluate the technological progress-
iveness of an industry.
This is by simple enumeration and comparison of
the number and importance of inventions and innova-
tions made over a certain time period in various
different industries, or by measuring 'inventive
effort' in terms of a gross count of 'research and
development' expenditures and personnel. °^
To examine technological progressiveness in the Bell System,
we must look at the Bell Telephone Laboratories - the re-
search and development arm of the Bell System.
BTL provides research and fundamental development, spe-
cific design and development of telecommunications technology
and products, technical support to the BOC's and AT&T,
development of business information systems programs for
the BOC's and work associated with Western Electric mili-
tary contracts.-1-" (Note: BTL undertakes military contracts
only if asked by the federal government and only on the
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contracts for which it has unique qualifications.) The own-
ership of BTL is split 50-50 between AT&T and Western Elec-
tric. However, Western Electric, through the years, has
invested more money in BTL for research and development than
AT&T; consequently by 1972 Western's investment in BTL
represented 70% of the total investment. 186 Today, BTL's
budget is over 2/3 of a billion dollars and it employs over
17,000 people. Beverly C. Moore, Jr. in an article "AT&T:
The Phony Monopoly" argues the BTL has been lethargic in
technological progress iveness because the Bell System in-
variably chooses more capital-intensive technology rather
than more productive and progressive technology. For example
In the early 1960 's when satellite communications
became feasible, the Bell System wanted to put fifty satel-
lites in a random orbit; this would require a huge capital
investment in satellite and ground stations. At the same
time, the aircraft industry and others were arguing for
satellites with synchronous orbits. This would require
far less capital.
The Bell System is reluctant to introduce new
technology until the old is fully amortized.
The Bell System is "top-heavy" with capital expan-
sion, i.e. assets three times greater than annual revenues.
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The Bell System's equipment proved to be techno-
logically behind when exposed to the "market test."
The method of figuring the rate base and a proper rate
of return forces the Bell System to act very conservative;
the regulatory environment thus contributes directly to the
problem of adequately measuring technological progress ive-
ness. It is not enough to have invented the transistor
in 1947; the authors agree, to some extent, with the un-
favorable assessment of BTL's technological progressive-
ness by Moore. However, Bain states: "Each industry should
be judged in terms of how well it did relative to what it
was possible to do„" In view of this, BTL's technological
progressiveness is not as unfavorable relative to its oppor-
tunities at the time. At this time a more meaningful
appraisal of BTL is difficult; it may be enough to note
technological progress whenever it occurs.
C. SELLING COSTS
Another aspect of an industry's performance consists of
sales promotional expenses, i.e. advertisement, expenses
incurred for product change and parts of the distributive
service that have a sales promotion orientation. Bain
defines selling cost as:
expenditures made by firms to stimulate the sales
volume of their products in two general ways ; by in-
forming potential customers of the availability,

characteristics and prices of the products; and by-
inducing or persuading them to buy.l°8
Most economists accept, as necessary to efficient market
performance, advertising which provides basic product in-
formation to buyers, expenditures on personal selling
sufficient to satisfy needed information for the buyer,
basic expenses for physical distribution of products, and
the incorporation of functional changes in product design.
Any expenditures above these basic levels is considered
wasteful; increased costs which do not increase industry
output are considered wasteful of society's resources and
are therefore undesirable. One of the problems encountered
in this area is measuring selling costs; no one has satis-
factorily defined what should be considered an acceptable
level of selling costs.
The Bell System's total advertising expense was $78.6
million in 1972, $85.5 million in 1973 and $88.9 million in
1974. (Calendar year dollars.) One of the concerns of
the FCC, is the treatment of advertising expense for rate-
making purposes. In Docket No. 19129, the FCC found a lack
of uniform and adequate definitions in Bell's method of
classifying advertising expenses. They also found advertis-
ing expenses were merged for monopoly and competitive ser-




example of cross -subs idation) . It is Bell's contention
that all advertisements "...provide a contribution to the
rest of the business, and the whole business benefits from
191those sales." This results in selling expenses promoting
the Bell System being charged in part to the general rate
payer on the grounds that it is part of the overall opera-
tion of the business. The FCC states that this:
does not provide an adequate basis for determining
what should or should not be the burden of the user
of interstate telephone services, nor are they ade-
quate reasons for the continued promotion of services
which use an ever-growing amount of natural resources
and capital. 192
Beverly Moore cites the following situation of excessive
selling costs in the Bell System:
...a public interest group with meager resources,
the Independent Voters of Illinois (IVI) , turned
up numerous questionable practices of the Illinois
Bell Telephone Company. Nearly $10 million had
been spent on advertising and public relations.
If this level of advertising per potential customer
were projected nationwide, IVI ' s expert testified,
Illinois Bell would rank as the twelfth largest
advertiser in the nation. Yet most of the adver-
tising was aimed not at providing useful information
to customers but purchasing their good will to make
them less resistant to rate increases. This was
evidenced by the grossly wasteful and inefficient
manner in which the advertising monies were spent.
For example, ads were aired on television to viewers
who had probably seen the same ads in a newspaper.
Other television ads, suggesting that the viewer
send for a copy of a free booklet, 'How to Save
Money on Long Distance, ' produced 23 responses at
an advertising cost of $325 per response. 193
162

This raises serious questions of excessive selling costs in
the Bell Operating Companies
.
The authors believe the academia program sponsored by
Bell System can be considered as an excessive selling cost.
It is an attempt by Bell to favorably involve the academic
community with the telephone industry. Its benefits to the
rate payer cannot be measured against its cost because
"...its results are a matter of Bell's judgment and its
overall cost is not readily available."
The Bell System also makes contributions to charitable
and community welfare organizations. Contributions in 1974
were well over $16 million. The Bell System contends these
contributions sustain economic and social viability of the
thousands of communities in which bell operates and
"...contribute significantly to lowering our costs to the
subscriber." The authors agree with the preliminary
findings of the FCC that there is no evidence that validates
this assertion. From the above discussion, it is concluded
that selling costs by the Bell System may be excessive, and
further study in this area is recommended.
D. TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
Industry performance in the dimension of technical
efficiency encompasses an appraisal of how closely an
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industry approaches the goal of supplying whatever output
it produces at the lowest attainable unit production costs.
Bain lists three criteria in determining the technical
efficiency of an industry:
(1) The extent to which the firms in an industry
and their plants attain or closely approach
optimal scales -or the proportion of industry
output that is supplied by plants and firms
of at least approximately optimal scale.
(2) The extent to which these firms and their plants
attain or closely approach optimal degrees of
vertical integration of successive processes or
functions
.
(3) The extent to which the firms attain or closely
approach the most efficient rates of utilization
of their plant facilities - in effect, the ex-
tent, if any, of 'chronic' excess capacity in
the indus try . ^ °
Examining the performance of technical efficiency of
the Bell System presents several difficulties. The first
problem is the diversification of the Bell System; it is
involved in equipment manufacturing, research and develop-
ment and operation and maintenance of the telephone net-
works throughout the United States. A second problem is
the enormous size of the Bell System; the sheer volume of
data presented to the FCC in tariff filings each year alone
is awesome. A third problem (which is significant in all
aspects of performance) is the bookkeeping methods employed
by the Bell System.
1 AA

The Uniform System of Accounts (USOA) was prescribed by
the FCC for telephone companies in 1935 and adopted in the
same year by the Bell System. Since then, there has been
no major revision of the USOA although the industry has
undergone dramatic changes. The fundamental drawback of
the USOA method is the non-availability of specific informa-
tion by service. For instance, there is no informational
breakdown of maintenance costs by type of equipment, cost
of equipment by types of service (e.g. WATS, TELPAK) or
experienced costs within a service offering (e.g. residential
vs. business MTS) . This poses substantial difficulties in
any analysis.
A fourth problem, mentioned previously, is the regulatory
climate. In particular the method of determining the rate
base has had a substantial impact on technical efficiency;
like technological progressiveness , both the state and
federal regulatories must share in the performance of tech-
nical efficiency. Because of the above difficulties and
also time constraints, the authors were unable to analyze
the three criteria suggested by Bain to any great depth;
therefore we will briefly comment only on certain areas
within the Bell System.
The Bell System's construction budget currently approaches
$10 billion. The telephone subscriber pays (ultimately) for
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capital expenditure although investors provide the dollars
used to build plant and equipment. The FCC has found that
Bell does not have any standards by which the magnitude of
its construction budget is determined. The only standard
apparent is that of Bell's "Fair Share Plan" which sets
forth the minimum earnings (rate of return) which an operat-
ing company should have in order to maintain construction
1 07
expenditures at high levels. y/ Further study of whether
this doctrine of "perpetual growth" is technically efficient
is recommended.
The Bell System contends that investment in toll network
trunk facilities is adequate, essential and prudent; however
in 1972 the FCC determined that Bell had an excess number of
trunks representing a wasted investment of $305.7 million.
In examining the third criteria of technical efficiency, the
authors support Bain's position that somewhat larger capaci-
ties are justified as being "most efficient." However, in
the case of the Bell System, under-utilization of existing
facilities is a way to expand the rate base. Peak telephone
usage, historically, has been in the business hours; at
other times the Bell facilities are idel. Instead of having
excess trunks, which is costly, the authors feel the Bell
System could reduce rates for calls made during the idle
periods. This strategy of "peak load pricing" creates an
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economic incentive for the user to place his call during
off-peak hours. The Bell System has instituted lower rates
for night and weekends long-distance calls but we believe
these are only token advances.
AT&T's General Department acts as the coordinator and
nerve center of the Bell System. The FCC found numerous
1 98
waste and inefficiency of this department. There was
a pervasive lack of effective communications with other
Bell entities, serious lags in decision-making, inefficient
utilization of General Department personnel and lapses in
budget and cost controls. "" A team of top executives who
studied the Bell license contract arrangement stated:
Under current conditions, where change is occuring
at an ever accelerating rate, the complexity and
size of the Bell System appears to be a handicap
to the decision process. D0
The question which needs further study is: whether the Bell
System would be more technically efficient if it was not so
"vertically concentrated?"
E. ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
Allocative efficiency as defined by Bain, "concerns
essentially the rate of output of the industry, or the
amount of scarce productive resources allocated to producing
its output - relative to the outputs produced and resources
201
committed in other industries. According to the theory
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of pure competition, the economy will attain its greatest
output when the profit rate realized by each industry in
the economy is equal; that is, when a shift of resources
from one industry to another would not result in any in-
909
crease in the economy's total output. (Allocative effi-
ciency has a couple of inherent difficulties which make it
debatable as a satisfactory criterion in measuring per-
formance. The definition of costs and profits is extremely
difficult in highly complex industries. A second problem
stems from the fact that allocative efficiency is not
attained in one industry alone, but requires economy-wide
adherence to optimum conditions. This os often referred to
the "second best" problem.) To measure allocative efficiency,
average profit rates, both on sales and on owners equity, in
various industries need to be examined and compared. (There
is an assumption which is often overlooked, that is, risks
encountered must be equal in nature for any type of compari-
son.) As mentioned above, optimal resource allocation assumes
that companies in each industry earn no more and no less than
a "normal" profit rate on the owners' investment in the
industry. (A "normal" profit rate is the return that would
be earned from alternate investments in the capital market,
i.e. going interest rate plus a risk premium.)
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Various marketing agencies give an intricate breakdown
of the financial picture of the telecommunications industry
(both Standard & Poors and Moody's Utilities do an excellent
job). However, the authors want to know how well this indus'
try "stacks up" against other industries. The "29th Annual
Report on American Industry" in FORBES
. 1 January 1977, pro-
vided the information needed. The following definitions are
taken from this report:
Return on Stockholders Equity:
Companies obtain their capital from two sources:
stockholders and creditors. Return on Stockholders'
Equity is the percentage return on the stockholders'
portion of the capital. We express earnings per
common share (primary basis) as a percentage of the
stockholders ' equity per share (assuming conversion
of all convertible preferreds) at the start of the
year. The five year return in the following table
is the average of the returns calculated for the
years 1972-1975 and the 12-month period ending with
the most recent quarterly report. (For those com-
panies whose fiscal years end in January, February
or March, the years 1973-1976 are used in place of
1972-75.)
Return on Total Capital:
This figure is the percentage return on a combina-
tion of stockholders' equity (both common and pre-
ferred) plus capital from long-term debt (including
current maturities), minority stockholders' equity
in consolidated subsidiaries and accumulated de-
ferred taxes and investment tax credits. The profit
figure used in this computation is the sum of net
income, minority interests in net income and esti-
mated aftertax interest paid on long-term debt--in
other words, income before charges (primarily,
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interest payments on long-term debt) relating to the
nonequity portion of the capital.
The Return on Total Capital is a "basic" measure
of an enterprise's profitability. It does not re-
flect - as the Return on Stockholders' Equity does -
the effects of financing decisions upon profitability
For companies that derive all of their capital from
common equity, the two profitability measures would,
of course, be identical. But a company that employs
debt wisely can thereby boost its Return on Stock-
holders ' Equity well above its Return on Total
Capital. The time periods employed for this calcu-
lation are the same as for Return on Stockholders'
Equity.
Debt-To-Equity Ratio:
The Debt/Equity Ratio tells us to what extent manage-
ment is using borrowed funds (leverage) in an attempt
to upgrade profitability. It is calculated as of the
end of the last reported fiscal year by dividing long-
term debt (including current maturities) by the sum
of stockholders' equity, minority stockholders'
interests and accumulated deferred taxes and invest-
ment tax credits. A high debt/equity ratio makes
earnings more volatile and is usually considered
prudent only in relatively stable industries.
Net Profit Margin:
The Net Profit Margin gives a view of profits differ-
ent from either the Return on Stockholders' Equity
or the Return on Total Capital. Calculated by
dividing net profits for the latest 12 months by net
sales, it reveals what percentage of each dollar of
revenue is available for payment of dividends and
reinvestment in the business. Net profit margins
vary widely from industry to industry.
Sales Growth:
This is a bit tricky. To even out shortrun distor-
tions caused by very poor or very good years, we reach
back over ten years to measure five-year Sales Growth.
We take the average sales for the most recent five
years (1972 through the latest 12 months) and compute
the percentage change from average sales for the
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preceding five years 1967-1971) . We then express
that change in terms of a five-year compounded
annual rate of growth, since the midpoints of the
two periods are five years apart.
Earnings -Per-Share Growth:
As with Sales Growth we go back ten years to calcu-
late the five year rate of Earnings -Per-Share
Growth. Using primary earning per share, we compare
those for the most recent five years against those
for the preceding five years and express the change
in terms of a five-year compounded annual growth
rate.
Table 5-1 shows the financial breakdown of the four
largest telephone companies (as mentioned earlier, they
account for over 97% of all business in the industry) . Their
profitability is measured in terms of stockholders equity and
total capital. Their growth is measured in both sales and
earnings. Stock market performance, debt/equity ratios and
net profit margins are also included. Using these measures
a company can be compared against other companies in its own
industry and against all 962 other companies reported by
FORBES . Finally, the major industry groups themselves are
compared against one another. Although the telecommunica-
tions industry is monopolistic, they appear to be allocatively
efficient. The regulation of the industry may account for
this performance in allocative efficiency. Further study is
needed, particularly of other regulated industries, to deter-
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the data presented needs to be undertaken to determine the
significance of the per cent spreads between major industrial
groupings.) The financial performance of the telephone sec-
tor has been, overall, outstanding. Standard and Poor's
Industry Analysis
. December, 1976, points to a positive and
favorable future. However, in examining the Bell System as
a separate entity, the FCC has argued that Western Electric 's
performance has been allocatively inefficient; Western
Electric has earned excess profits because it's risk in the
vertically integrated system is indistinguishable from that
of the operating companies. (Western Electric enjoys a
privileged market position.) Further study is needed in
this area before any definite conclusions concerning allo-
cative efficiency can be drawn.
F. FULL EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Any meaningful discussion of how the domestic tele-
communications industry affects full employment and income
distribution is beyond the scope of this thesis. A few
brief comments on these two areas will, hopefully, show
how complex these areas can be.
Caves offers two hypotheses which are contradictory
concerning full employment:
(1) Monopolists being more sure of their market and
subject to less uncertainty might maintain a
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more suitable rate of investment over time.
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(2) The rigid prices which are observed in some types
of oligopolies make employment fluctuate more over
the business cycle than it would if these prices
were flexible. ^4
No study has shown conclusively either of these hypoth-
eses to be true. In fact, defining what is meant by "full"
employment is a question "hotly" debated among economists.
Caves 1 statement concerning full employment and price
stability is pertinent to the telecommunications industry:
With regard to achieving full employment without in-
flation, we have little evidence that concentration
or other dimensions of market structure affect the
stability of output and employment in the economy.
The pricing practices used in concentrated industries,
however, make it harder to use public policy to main-
tain full employment without inflation.
The manner of income distribution has been a major
concern to welfare economists. It is a complex subject;
relatively strong theoretical arguments have been presented
but the empirical evidence is weak. The theoretical argu-
ment which attempts to link industry structure to this
dimension of performance is : "To the extent that highly
concentrated industries tend to earn excess profits and
to the degree that ownership is likewise concentrated high
monopoly incomes will be obtained by a few people." To
some advocates, equitable income distribution relates to





...lies not with the distribution of income, but
the distribution of the size of business firms
themselves. They feel ours would be a better
society if all businesses were small, if the maxi-
mum number of citizens were independent proprietors
rather than employees serving the economic interest
of an employee. They oppose monopoly, but even if
all industries were competitive enough to give the
best possible market performance, they would still
like to dismantel any remaining businesses which
were large by some absolute standard.
^
WD
Again, Caves states: "Economists prefer to leave policy
toward income distribution to the field of taxation which
207
is much better equipped to deal with it directly."
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VI. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AS A CONSUMER
The Department of Defense (DOD) is a major consumer of
services and facilities offered by the firms comprising the
domestic telecommunications industry. According to the
most recent listing of companies doing the largest dollar
volume of business with the DOD, AT&T ranked seventeenth,
with sales of $447 million, and GT&E ranked thirty-ninth,
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with sales of $189.7 million. Clearly, DOD annually
requires a sizable amount of telecommunications services
and facilities, procured commercially, in the performance
of its missions. (The telecommunications services and facil'
ities mentioned in this analysis refer to those of a gener-
ally commercial nature and not the highly sophisticated
military tactical communications systems or command and
control systems.) It should be noted that smaller firms
in the industry, including SCC ' s
,
VAN's, and DSC ' s , provide
a small percentage of these requirements but as noted above,
AT&T and GT&E provide the vast majority.
The relationship of DOD to the firms in the telecommuni-
cations industry has not been without impact on the disburse-
ment of contracts. Two illustrations which follow will
demonstrate the close ties with the established common
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carriers which DOD has developed since its inception in
1947, and which have contributed to the large business done
by the established common carriers with DOD.
The antitrust suit filed against AT&T in 1949 by the
Department of Justice was terminated in 1956 by a consent
decree, details of which were cited in Chapter Two. However,
DOD's relationship with AT&T had a profound influence on the
eventual outcome of the suit.
The interplay of several forces doomed the lofty
public interest objectives of the litigation. The
Government's desire for AT&T to take over management
of the trouble-plagued Sandia Laboratory, which was
attempting to manufacture atomic bombs in the beginning
of the cold war period, had a fatal effect on the law-
suit. The Sandia project was in such disarray that
the Bell System was considered one of the few organi-
zations capable of directing the complex scientific
and technological manufacturing process. Management
of Sandia was undertaken by the Sandia Corporation,
a wholly owned, but non-profit, subsidiary of Western
Electric. AT&T took every opportunity to note that
Western must remain part of the Bell System if the
crucial national security goal was to be achieved.
Essentially, Bell held the production of atomic
weapons as a hostage in its legal battles with the
Antitrus t Divis ion . ^09
Attorney General Herbert Brownell, taking office in
1953, did not favor the numerous antitrust suits he had
inherited from the Truman Administration and thus undertook
private discussions with AT&T. Bell officials constantly
emphasized the importance of an integrated Bell System to
national defense, noting not only the Sandia effort but
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Western Electric s leading role in the various Nike missile
projects and the "DEW Line" radar systems. 210 Thus DOD, in
relying upon AT&T for such vital national security projects,
had become AT&T's ally in its antitrust suit and the knot
had been joined for a close business relationship continuing
until the present.
The second illustration is of the Armed Forces Communi-
cations and Electronics Association (AFCEA) , a relationship
which represents the voluntary symbiosis of the military
establishment and the communications, as well as electronics,
Oil
industries. x Founded in 1946, AFCEA is dedicated, in its
own words, "to the military-civilian partnership concept."
This alliance of industrial and military leadership draws
from the higher echelons of each and has "fashioned a
community of interest so closely interwoven that whatever
affects the progress of one partner is reflected in the
212progress of the other." Today, the officers and directors
of AFCEA drawn from industry predominately represent the
established common carriers, such as AT&T, GT&E, the remain-
ing large TTC's, Western Union, and finally the manufacturing
arm of AT&T - Western Electric. Given these two preceding
examples, the DOD inclination toward these carriers, in
relation to the smaller telecommunications firms, is great
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indeed even with a concerted effort by DOD to be truly com-
petitive in its procurement practices.
A. SERVICES /FACILITIES CONTRACTED
For purposes of this discussion, a distinction should be
made between services and facilities. As delineated in an
Arthur D. Little Inc. study on Competitive Acquisition of
Telecommunications by the Federal Government , a service
procurement places responsibility for system design, in-
stallation, maintenance, and operation with the contractor
who owns and provides the facilities. In a facilities pro-
curement, those responsibilities rest with the procurer;
either as placed upon the procurer's own staff or upon a
contractor selected by the procurer to undertake the respon-
sibilities. 213 As an example, DOD ' s AUTODIN II is a service
procurement with Western Union providing total resources
and assuming responsibility whereas a facilities procurement
might be evidenced by the Defense Communications Agency's
(DCA) procurement of an individual AUTOVON circuit from the
Joint -TELPAK pool: DCA is responsible for the system opera-
tion employing the additional circuit and has previously
selected AT&T and several ITC ' s as contractors responsible
for the system operation and maintenance of AUTOVON.
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B. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH CONTRACTED
Present procurement policies of DOD, in the procurement
of telecommunications services and facilities of a generally
commercial nature, set forth competitive bidding as the
recommended procedure. However several factors tend to
diminish the promise of this goal: (1) a certain overhead
in preparing statements of work for competitive bidding is
involved which is greater than that involved with a negoti-
ated or sole source procurement under conditions as set forth
in the Armed Forces Procurement Regulations (ASPR) ; and (2)
the close rapport between DOD and the established common
carriers weighs heavily toward AT&T and Western Union
claiming the majority of commercial telecommunications con-
tracts let. SCC's and DSC ' s do have minor contractual ser-
vices with DOD but it is only a recent happening; "(they)
are only now beginning to become involved in providing tele-
communications services ... .They have the facilities and
tariffed services to participate more extensively in the
Government market, however." In actuality, approximately
99 per cent of the government circuits leased from common
carriers for both common-user and dedicated networks are
routed on Joint-TELPAK, which is provided by AT&T and
lie
Western Union. Due to the recent FCC decision in the
Private Line Rate Case, FCC Docket 18128, however, AT&T and
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Western Union will have to refile their TELPAK. tariffs and
it remains to be seen if significant inroads are made by
SCC's, VAN's, and DSC ' s in providing services and facilities
to DOD.
As documented in the Arthur D. Little Inc. study mentioned
previously, it is generally apparent that the established
common carriers have dominated DOD's procurement of commer-
cially available telecommunications services and facilities.
A final comment should be added to understand the dilemma
confronting DOD in exercising competitive acquisition of its
required services. The acquisition of telecommunications
facilities, from possibly numerous vendors, rather than the
acquisition of telecommunications services, from usually a
single vendor, might potentially result in excessive fragment-
ation, which is defined as the leasing or purchasing of
different portions of the facilities or equipment needed to
provide an overall telecommunications service from various
vendors. 1& Clearly, fragmentation can result in additional
burdens for DOD since more system planning, design, mainten-
ance and operation are involved than in a service procurement.
But the Catch-22 is that the established common carriers
(AT&T, major ITC ' s , and Western Union) are essentially the




C. ALTERNATE PURCHASING ENVIRONMENTS
If the above description is taken as the present state
of telecommunications procurement by DOD, then several alter-
natives present themselves if it is also accepted that pre-
sent procurement practices can be improved. That the
government considers this the case can be seen in the
issuance of two circulars relating to future procurement
policies in the federal government. The Office of Manage-
ment and the Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 and the Office of
Telecommunications Policy (OTP) Circular 13 both concern the
fundamental requirement to provide telecommunications service
for the federal government at the "highest possible level of
operating reliability, with optimum efficiency and lowest
reasonable cost, and with maximum dependence on the private
sector of the U.S. economy." 217 Thus in parallel with FCC
rulings favoring competition in the private line service (PLS)
and terminal equipment markets, OMB and OTP realize the oper-
ating efficiences which would accrue to government agencies,
in particular DOD, if competitive service and facilities
procurements were the rule rather than the exception.
Implementation is the difficult part however, since SCC's,
VAN's, DSC ' s and IC's cannot compete favorably with the
established common carriers for service procurements. On
the other hand, they can compete favorably on facilities
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procurements. Thus OMB A-76 and OTP 13 place DOD in a basic
quandry: whether to emphasize service over facilities pro-
curements or vice versa?
DOD is consequently faced with a situation unique to
most consumers: a real and significant opportunity to effect
the development of the telecommunications industry in the
near future, since it currently is and will continue to
be a primary user of the industry's services and facilities.
In effect, DOD by itself has sufficient leverage to enforce
the executive branch of the government's (FCC, OTP, Depart-
ment of Justice) decisions regarding competition within the
PLS and terminal equipment markets, and possibly in addi-
tional markets. Procurement of facilities from firms other
than the established common carriers will likely further
the direction of the FCC's recent decisions and promote
more viable PLS and terminal equipment markets. As a corol-
lary, it probably will provide added impetus to innovative
telecommunications technology so crucial to DOD. Yet the
price of "sponsorship" of the facilities approach - the
more competitive avenue - is high system overhead manifested
in fragmentation.
Thus the ubiquitous DOD "tradeoff" ensues. The authors
believe the problem is indeed substantial and the approach
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decided upon by DOD will have a profound impact on the tele-




VII. FINAL THOUGHTS AND POLICY OPTIONS
This thesis effort has covered much ground to this
point. An historical overview of the domestic telecommuni-
cations industry has been presented; the structure, conduct,
and performance of the industry were examined and the rela-
tionship between the Department of Defense and the industry
was described. In this final chapter, future trends in the
telecommunications industry are posited and the public
policy options which will determine the structure, conduct,
and performance of the industry in years ahead are briefly
examined.
Today, the United States economy is the largest producer
of goods and services in the world. Economic forecasts by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics project that the nation's
economy will experience continued growth in the next decade.
The domestic telecommunications industry is expected to play
a vital role in this continued growth. In fact, some
economists predict that a new industry is emerging now --
the "information transfer industry." In this new industry,
knowledge is the strategic resource rather than raw materials,
and information, its formation and transmittal, will be the
critical transforming source; the telecommunications industry
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will be only one aspect of the "information transfer
industry." Evidence of this new industry includes:
(1) Over 50 per cent of the U.S. workers are employed
by the information sector of the economy. Table 7-1 projects
the shift from goods to services on the basis of employment
through 1980. 218
(2) Service exports have already overtaken goods in
the mix of goods and services that we export abroad; in the
219
next 20 years the gap is expected to widen.
(3) Indications of this new industry can be seen in:
* How we produce
* How we transact business
* How we pay
* How we are billed
* How news is gathered and spread
* How we communicate.
The "information transfer industry" will effect the
entire spectrum of the economy and not be restricted to only
the computer and the telecommunications industries; diverse
industries such as banking, manufacturing, insurance, and
education will be effected. Dependence upon information
and its transmittal will be crucial. The questions of what
and how information services are provided, who provides them





Sector Distribution of Employment by Goods and Services, 1968
Projected to 1980 (in thousands)
PERCENTAGE
CHANGE
1968 1980 1968 - 1980
TOTAL 80,780 99,600 23
GOODS -PRODUCING TOTAL 28,975 31,600 9
Agriculture, forestry, and
fisheries 4,150 3,180 (-23)
Mining 640 590 (-9)
Construction 4,050 5,480 35
Manufacturing 20,125 22,358 11
Durable 11,850 13,275 12
Non-durable 8,270 9,100 10
SERVICE -PRODUCING TOTAL 51,800 67,980 31
Transportation and utilities 4,500 5,000 10
Trade (Wholesale and retail) 16,600 20,500 23












Source: The U.S. Economy in 1980 , Bureau of Labor Statistics
Bulletin 1673 (1970). The data for 1968 and 1980 are from
Table A-16, p. 49.
Note: The figures for 1980 assume a 3 per cent unemployment.
At a 4 per cent unemployment, there would be a drop in the
labor force of one million (i.e. from 99,600 to 98,600), and
this loss is distributed between goods -producing (31,600 to
31,000) and service-producing (67,980 to 67,300) employment.
Figures are not always exact because of rounding.
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Several forces are driving the economy in the direction
of information services; however the dominant force is
technological change, particularly in the fields of Large
Scale Integration (LSI), terminal growth, computers, and
communications. (The growth potential in the telecommunica-
tions industry is staggering; the Bell System is in the pro-
cess of replacing all electromechanical toll switches with
completely electronic, digital switching (ESS).) Bell pre-
dicts long distance usage to increase 150 per cent in 10
years . Satellite costs are continually declining. As
AT&T noted in their 1976 Annual Stockholders Report, the
innovation of light wave technology (fiber-optics) will
greatly enhance the channel capacity in communication
applications
.)
The range of new information services also appears




1. Cashless Society Transactions :
Recording of financial transactions, with a hard-
copy output for buyer and seller, a permanent
record and updating of balance in computer memory.
2. Dedicated Newspaper :
A set of pages with printed and graphic informa-
tion, possibly including photographs, the
organization of which has been predetermined by
the user to suit his preferences.
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3. Computer-Aided School Instruction :
At the very minimum, computer determination of
the day's assignment for each pupil, and at the
end of the day, recording of the day's progress
report. At its most complex, such a service
would use a real time, interactive video color
display with voice input and output and an approp-
riate program suited to each pupil's progress
and temperament
.
4. Shopping Transactions (Store Catalogs) :
Interactive programs, perhaps video assisted,
which describe or show goods at request of the




Person-to -Person (Paid Work at Home) :
Switched video and facsimile service substituting
for normal day's contacts of middle-class manager-
ial personnel where daily contacts are mostly of
a routine nature. May also apply to contacts with
the public by receptionist, doctor or his assist-
ant, etc.
6. Plays and Movies from a Video Library :
Selection of all plays and movies. Color and
sound are required.
7 Computer Tutor :
From a library of self-help programs available,
a computer, in an interactive mode, coaching
the pupil (typically adult) in the chosen
subject.
8. Message Recording :
Probably of currently available type but may
include video memory (a patient showing doctor
rash he has developed)
.
9 Secretarial Assistance :
Written or dictated letters typed by a remotely
situated secretary.
10. Household Mail and Messages :
Letters and notes transmitted directly to or from
the house by means of home facsimile machines.
11. Mass Mail and Direct Advertising Mail :
Higher output, larger size pages, color output
may be necessary to attract the attention of the
recipient -- otherwise similar to item 10 above.
12 Answering Services :
Storage of incoming messages or notes whom to
call, possibly with computer logic recognizing
emergency situations and diverting the call.
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13. Grocery Price List, Information and Ordering :
Grocery price list providing up-to-the-minute,
undated information about perishable foodstuffs.
Video color display may be needed to allow
selection of selected merchandise.
14. Access to Company Files :
Information in titles, coded for security;
regularly updated files are available with
cross references, indicating the code where
detailed information is stored. Synthesis
also may be available.
15
.
Fares and Ticket Reservations :
As provided by travel agencies now but more
comprehensive and faster. Cheapest rates,
information regarding the differences between
carriers with respect to service, memos, etc.,
may be available.
16. Past and Forthcoming Events :
Events, dates of events, and their brief des-
cription; short previews of future theater
plays; and recordings of past events.
17. Correspondence School :
Taped or live high school, university, and
vocational courses available on request with
an option either to audit or take for credit.
Course would be on TV, paper support on
facsimile.
18. Daily Calendar and Reminder about Appointments :
Prerecorded special appointments and regularly
occurring appointments stored as a programmed
reminder.
19 . Computer-Assisted Meetings :
Participation of computer as a partner in a
meeting, answering questions of fact, deriving
correlations, and extrapolating trends.
20. Newspaper, Electronic, General :
Daily newspaper, possibly printed during the
night, available in time for breakfast. Special
editions following major news breaks.
21. Adult Evening Courses on TV :
Noninteractive, broadcast mode live courses on TV-
wider choice of subjects than at present.
22 Banking Services :
Money Orders, transfers, advice.
23. Legal Information :
Directory of lawyers, computerized legal counsel-
ing giving precedents, rulings in similar cases,
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describing jurisdiction of various courts and
chances of successful suits in a particular
area of litigation.
24. Special Sales Information :
Any sales within the distance specified by the
user and for items specified by him will be
"flashed" onto the home display unit.
25
.
Consumers' Advisory Service :
Equivalent of Consumer Reports, giving best buy,
products rated "acceptable," etc.
26. Weather Bureau :
Country -wide, regional forecasts or special
forecasts (for farmers, fishermen), hurricane
and tornado warnings similar to current AAU
special forecast service.
27. Bus. Train, and Air Scheduling :
Centrally available information with one number
to call.
28. Restaurants :
Following a query for a type of restaurant
(Japanese, for instance), reservations, menu,
prices are shown. Displays of dishes, loca-
tion of tables, may be included.
29. Library Access :
After an interactive "browsing" with a
"librarian computer" and a quotation for the
cost of hard copy facsimile or a slow scan
video transmission, a book or a magazine is
transmitted to the home.
30. Index. All Services. Served by the Home Terminal :
Includes prices or charges of the above, or
available communications services .221
Given this anticipated trend, coupled with the state of the
industry as discussed herein, what public policy alternatives
are available in the telecommunications industry?
One policy alternative would be maintenance of the per-
vasive government control, i.e., government regulation would
continue. Walter Adams states:
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The advocates of public regulation or public
ownership hope simultaneously to ensure industrial
efficiency and to avoid the abuses of private
monopoly - not by the dissolution of monopoly but
by its social control.
Unfortunately, this has not really worked. Caves states:
Comparisons of the performance of public
utilities in states with regulatory commissions to
their performance in states without them have turned
up very little difference in prices paid by consumers
that could be imputed to the effect of regulation. 223
In the telecommunications industry, regulation has not
challenged nor inhibited holding company growth. Attempts
to impose arms length bargaining within the holding com-
panies has met with repeated failure. The Bell System's
budget is larger than each of the fifty state's budgets
and larger than the combined budget of the Federal Court
System, the U.S. Congress, and all the Federal Regulatory
Agencies. Can an industry possessed with this formidable
power be held accountable for the exercise of that power
by an agency (FCC) whose total budget is 8,000 times smaller?
A second alternative is a rejection of private monopoly
and the promotion of vigorous competition within the general
framework of the antitrust laws. Again, Walter Adams states:
The advocates for greater competition through
vigorous antitrust enforcement reject both the
Scylla of private monopoly and the Charydis of public
ownership. Believing that the preservation of compet-
itive free enterprise is both desirable and possible,
they point out that this does not mean a return to
the horse-and-buggy age nor a strict adherence to the
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textbook theories of 'perfect' or 'pure' competition.
What they advocate is a structural arrangement in
private industry characterized by decentralized
dec is ion-making and 'effective' competition.
The basic statement of Congressional communications policy
objectives --Section 1 of the Communications Act of 1934--
directs, in part, that communications services be made
"...available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States..." After a 100 year effort, with over 94 per
cent of the nation's households having telephone service, it
is fair to say that this goal has been achieved. This being
so, it is now incumbent upon the telecommunications industry
to make sure that "all the people" receive the "rapid,
effie ient. . .communication service" also mandated by Section
1. The FCC's recent decisions coupled with the Justice
Department's decision to prosecute AT&T under the antitrust
laws underscroes the government's current thrust towards
more competition in the industry.
The telephone companies (Bell and the ITC's) argue that
existing communications policy recognizes that the optimal
structure of the telecommunications industry is a "natural
monopoly" which should provide all communications services.
The telephone companies claim that recent FCC decisions
allowing limited competition in the equipment and private
line service markets violate this policy. They have
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introduced the Consumer Communications Reform Act (CCRA)
to reestablish their perceived position of dominance. Time
constraints keep us from examining this bill in detail;
however the authors believe it to be an unprecedented grab
for monopoly power by the telephone companies. The authors
feel competition does well what monopoly cannot do; it
rewards the innovator, the responsive manager, the efficient
supplier and it encourages diversity in ideas and innovation.
As the country stands on the threshold of a new technological
era, rather than a reaffirmation of monopoly, we need a re-
affirmation of competition. Dr. Whitehead, former Director
of OTP stated in 1974 before the Senate Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly:
We in government should reaffirm that in the
absence of compelling unusual circumstances our
economy will be based on competition, and insist
that that policy be pursued. If we modernize our
Communications Act and our regulatory process to
conform to that policy, we can expect that we will
continue to have the finest telephone system in the
world and will have, in addition, a host of diverse
services available to those in industry and the public
who want or need them. 225
The authors subscribe generally to this latter public
policy alternative of competition, promoted vigorously within
the regulatory framework presently established. The compe-
tition in the terminal equipment and PLS markets has con-
tributed greatly to higher quality service and increased
194

telecommunications innovation. As a next step, we believe
the FCC should consider the implementation of the compet-
itive bidding elements between supplier and user mandated
for the DSC ! s , among the established common carriers and
all interconnect equipment manufacturers, whether affiliated




RATE OF RETURN FORMULAE
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In prescribing carrier rates, both the FCC and state
regulatory commissions begin by determining the amount of
revenues a carrier should earn on all of its service offer-
ings. In other words, services are initially considered
in the aggregate, and the earnings and costs of each indi-
vidual service are not addressed.
1. The Revenue Requirement
Effective regulation causes the regulated firm to
operate at "cost," that is, in a manner such that revenues
are just sufficient to cover reasonable operating expenses
plus the cost of capital. In other words, a carrier is
entitled to recover its legitimate business expenses plus
a fair return on the property used in providing services to
the public. This total dollar amount is the carrier's rev-
enue requirement.
The formula used to calculate a carrier's overall
revenue requirement may be described as follows:
R = E + (P-D)K
R is the annual revenue requirement.
E is the annual operating expense.




D is the accumulated depreciation reserve.
(P-D) is the rate base for a carrier, i.e., the
original cost of property less depreciation.
K is the rate of return which is derived from
the costs to a carrier in securing capital.
Once the revenue requirement is determined, the carrier files
tariffs for its service with rates designed to earn that
allowable dollar amount of revenues.
2. Operating Expense
Under the broad classification of expenses used by-
telephone companies, maintenance, taxes, and depreciation
are the three largest categories. Lesser amounts are re-
corded under tariff expenses, commercial expenses, marketing
expenses and general office salaries and expenses. Expenses
which are allowed by the regulatory commission as part of
the revenue requirement are said to be incurred "above the
line." Those expenses which are not allowed as a part of
the revenue requirement are characterized as "below the line."
For example, legal expenses incurred by the utility in seek-
ing to get its rates increased are above the line. However,
social club dues are generally considered to be below the
line.
3. The Rate Base
The rate base consists of the net value of the prop-
erty used and useful in providing the utility service. In
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determining the rate base the Federal Communications Commis-
sion uses the original cost of the property as entered on
the carrier's books in accordance with the Uniform System
of Accounts. Similar procedures have been followed by most
regulatory commissions since the Supreme Court's decision in
the Hope Case of 1944 (FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Company , 320
U.S. 591).
Items such as land, buildings, switching machines,
cables, poles, microwave radio towers, maintenance trucks,
telephone instruments, etc. are evaluated in the rate base.
Since the amount of return allowed (in dollars) is dependent
upon the size of the rate base, it is sometimes claimed that
the utility will seek to invest heavily and substitute
capital for labor wherever possible. In particular, Averch
and Johnson have performed an analysis which indicates that
when the allowed rate of return is greater than the cost of
capital, the regulated firm will seek to expand into addi-
tional regulated markets (that is, expand its rate base)
even though it may be operating unprofitably in some of
these areas (Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson, "The Firm
under Regulatory Constraint," American Economic Review ,




Depreciation is an especially important category of
expense in utility regulation, for the annual depreciation
charge is an allowable operating expense, and the cumulated
charges constitute the depreciation reserve, which is de-
ducted from the gross value of the plant in determining the
rate base. Because of the importance of this item, the
service lives of various classes of plant, salvage values
and rates of depreciation are strictly regulated in great
detail by the regulatory authorities. The FCC uses straight
line, average service life, group depreciation.
5. Cost of Capital or Rate of Return
A carrier is given an opportunity to earn a "fair"
return on the value of the property which it employs for
the convenience of the public (i.e., its rate base). This
return contemplates compensation to the carrier and investors
for capital invested in property, as well as compensation for
risks involved in providing services. Under judicial pre-
cedents, a carrier is guaranteed an opportunity to earn a
high enough return to maintain its credit standing, attract
additional capital, and provide earnings comparable to
companies having corresponding risks. Stated in simple terms,
the allowable rate of return is the weighted average of the
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cost of embedded debt capital and the cost of equity capital.
Thus, three factors are essential to its determination:
1. Cost of Embedded Debt - This is the interest
a carrier must pay to service its outstand-
ing bonds and loans
.
2. Cost of Equity - The return that investors
require in order to invest in a given company.
3. Capital Structure - This is the relationship
of debt to equity in terms of the carrier's
total cost of capital.
A carrier's rate of return may be expressed by the following
formula:
(D)(Pd) + (E)(Pe) = Rate of Return
D is the cost of the embedded debt.
Pd is the proportion of total capital costs
attributable to debt.
E is the cost of equity.
Pe is the proportion of total capital costs
attributable to equity.
If there is general investor optimism about receiving
high returns on utility stock, the price of the stock will
rise and the cost of equity capital will fall. On the other
hand, if the investors are pessimistic about the utility's
prospects, the price of the stock will fall and the cost of
equity capital will rise. In strictly financial terms, what
is seemingly good for the utility's customers (low prices)
is not good for the utility's stockholders if it means
excessively low rates of return on equity. Thus, if prices
are so low that the utility's earned rate of return is below
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the cost of capital, investor expectations will deteriorate,
the price of the stock will fall, and the utility will be
financially weakened. On the other hand, if high prices
yield a return exceeding the cost of capital, the consumer
is being charged excessive rates.
6. Accounts and Reports
In order to maintain appropriate surveillance over
carrier operating expenses, rate base and return, the regu-
latory commission prescribes the system of accounts to be
maintained by the carriers and requires the submission of
periodic financial and operating reports in accordance with
explicit and detailed rules. Accounting rules set forth
among other things, the kinds of outlays which are to be
capitalized and amortized, as well as those which must be
considered as current operating expenses. The reports con-
tain details of the financial structure and security owner-
ship of the regulated company, names and salaries of officers
and directors, amounts of assets, liabilities, income, ex-
penses, and detailed supporting schedules for these major
item classifications. Generally, the States have adopted
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